Risk Management for the Age of Information – The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century, Robert J. Shiller, Princeton University Press, 2003 by Pereira, Michael
Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law
Volume 9, Number 3 2004 Article 4
Risk Management for the Age of Information
– The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st
Century, Robert J. Shiller, Princeton
University Press, 2003
Michael Pereira∗
∗
Copyright c©2004 by the authors. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is produced
by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
BOOK REVIEW
RISK MANAGEMENT FOR THE AGE OF
INFORMATION-
THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST
CENTURY, ROBERT J. SHILLER, PRINCETON
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2003; pp. xvi, 366
Michael Pereira*
Introduction .................................................................. 7 16
I. Private Sector Ideas ................................................... 721
A. Livelihood Insurance ............................................. 721
B. Home Equity Insurance .......................................... 724
C. Income Linked Loans ............................................. 725
II. Private Sector Ideas-Problems and Solutions ..................... 726
A. Hedging and Macro Markets .................................... 727
B. Information and Global Risk Information Databases ......... 733
C. Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Indexes ............... 736
1. Insurance Demand ............................................. 737
2. Moral Hazard ................................................... 741
3. Adverse Selection ............................................. 745
4. Income-Linked Loans, Moral Hazard and
Adverse Selection ............................................. 749
D. Indexes and Law ................................................... 751
1. Public Nuisance ................................................ 752
2. C ontracts ......................................................... 753
3. T akings ......................................................... 755
E. Implementing the Ideas ............................................. 758
III. Public Sector Ideas ...................................................... 759
A. Inequality Insurance and the Tax Code ........................... 760
B. Intergenerational Social Security ................................. 763
Associate, Ropes & Gray LLP. Thanks to Gideon Parchomovsky, Frederick Pereira,
Josh Lustig and Charles Soule for very helpful comments. Special thanks to Peter
Siegelman for suggesting the writing of this review and providing invaluable assistance
at every stage of the process.
715
716 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LAW
C. Revamping Tax and Social Security? .............. . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . 765
D. New Units of Measurement and Electronic Money ............ 769
E. International Agreements for Risk Control and Foreign Aid ... 773
C onclusion .................................................................. 776
INTRODUCTION
Noted author and financial commentator Peter Bernstein began his
book Against the Gods with a provocative question: "What is it that
distinguishes the thousands of years of history from what we think of as
modem times? The answer," Bernstein argues, "goes way beyond the
progress of science, technology, capitalism, and democracy. The
revolutionary idea that defines the boundary between modem times and
the past is the mastery of risk .... The ability to define what may
happen in the future and to choose among alternatives lies at the heart of
contemporary societies."' In this spirit, Robert Shiller, in The New
Financial Order ("NFO"), outlines a radical rethinking of the biggest
risks facing society. NFO is an ambitious book, the product of many
years of thought, scholarship and even entrepreneurship dedicated to its
ideas. The proposals in NFO range from incremental improvements to
existing risk management systems to wholesale reworkings of some of
society's largest institutions. Shiller's ideas warrant serious attention.
His last book, Irrational Exuberance, came out in March 2000, at the
height of the Internet bubble. There Shiller argued--quite against the
spirit of the times-that both the level of the stock market and the
importance people attached to it were greatly exaggerated.2 Investors
ignored his warnings at their peril.' Once again, Shiller is cautioning
that society faces risks that are massive but for various reasons all but
invisible. And once again, we would do well to heed his counsel.*
1. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK
1-2 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1998).
2. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 252-55. (Princeton Univ.
Press 2000) [hereinafter SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE].
3. See, e.g., JOHN CASSIDY, DOT.CON: THE GREATEST STORY EVER SOLD 124
(HarperCollins 2002) (describing overheated equity valuations in the late 1990s and
citing Shiller).
4. From another perspective, NFO may be viewed as a strange sequel to Irrational
Exuberance. Whereas the former questioned the fundamental efficiency of financial
markets, the latter suggests that various social ills can be solved or mitigated through
dramatic and innovative expansions in financial markets. One is tempted to ask why, if
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The thrust of NFO is that the information technology revolution is
creating both unprecedented threats to people's financial well-being,
and, at the same time, unprecedented opportunities for risk
management.5 The book is divided into five parts. In Part One, Shiller
argues that rapid and accelerating advances in technology are creating
new and potentially devastating risks that are inadequately addressed by
existing risk management institutions.6  Technology threatens to
exacerbate existing inequality among and within nations: whole
categories of employment may vanish, home values may decline
precipitously, and a nation's GDP may shrink suddenly relative to the
GDPs of other nations. The problem is, there's no way to know ex ante
where losses will fall. Moreover, certain cognitive obstacles prevent
people from perceiving risks that accumulate gradually.8 Fortunately, as
Shiller explains in Part Two, the dynamics giving rise to such threats
also are creating opportunities: new technology and novel insights into
the psychology of risk can be harnessed to spread the loss of major
dislocations. 9 In the operational sections of the book, Parts Three and
Four, Shiller presents his core ideas for a new financial order. Certain of
Shiller's ideas are intended for implementation by the private sector;
others would be the duty of govemments' ° Though Shiller does not
explicitly structure NFO this way, I think the private-public distinction
provides a useful framework in approaching the book.
On the private side, Shiller argues that society-wide risk
management could be vastly improved if private firms offered livelihood
insurance, home equity insurance and income-linked loans." However,
Shiller thinks conventional financial markets performed so poorly at the turn of the
millennium, he is so eager to create new financial instruments.
5. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 1-2 (Princeton Univ. Press 2003) [hereinafter SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCAL
ORDER].
6. See id. at 17.
7. See id. at 22-57.
8. See id. at 91-92.
9. See id. at 18.
10. Seeid. at4.
11. As discussed more fully below, livelihood insurance and home equity insurance
are different from, respectively, unemployment insurance and homeowners insurance in
two important ways. First, one need not lose one's job to collect under a livelihood
policy, and one's home need not be damaged to collect under a home equity policy.
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private firms seeking to market such products face problems of both
supply and demand. With respect to supply, there is no way to hedge
the risks the products create-that is, no way for insurers or banks to
spread or lay off the risks they take on by selling the products-and
there is no database containing the information required to structure and
settle the products." With respect to demand, the problems of moral
hazard and adverse selection (both described and discussed below) make
it difficult to market the products profitably. 3 Shiller has answers to
these problems. To enable banks and insurers to hedge the risks created
by his products, he proposes macro markets-markets for trading the
largest income flows (such as occupational incomes) and asset values
(such as home prices).' 4  To solve the information problem, Shiller
proposes global risk information databases, or GRIDs-huge, constantly
updated compilations of all data relevant to the financial risks faced by
individuals, corporations and governments. 5 And to take care of moral
hazard and adverse selection, Shiller introduces the powerful idea of
settling certain classes of insurance contracts and setting income-linked
loan repayment terms based on indexes of incomes and housing prices.'
6
Second, payouts under the policies are determined by incomes in one's field and home
prices in one's area, not by individual income or home price.
12. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 189.
13. It is not entirely clear whether moral hazard and adverse selection are issues of
demand or supply. Regardless of how they are characterized, both threaten to
undermine the efficient functioning of insurance markets.
14. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 121-38.
15. See id. at 189-20.
16. Barron's Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms defines an "index" as a
[S]tatistical composite that measures changes in the economy or in financial markets,
often expressed in percentage changes from a base period or from the previous
month.... Indices also measure the ups and downs of stock, bond, and commodities
markets, reflecting market prices and the number of shares outstanding for the
companies in the index. Some well-known indices are the Dow Jones Averages, the
New York Stock Exchange Composite Index, the American Stock Exchange
Composite Index, the Standard & Poor's 500 Index, the NASDAQ Composite Index,
the Russell 2000 Index and the Value Line Composite Index....
JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 273-74 (5th ed. 1998). A note for grammarians: the word "index"
has two proper plural forms: "indexes" and "indices." See
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=index (last visited Feb. 28, 2004). Following
Shiller, this Review employs the former.
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On the public side, Shiller offers three domestic policy proposals
and one foreign policy proposal. With respect to domestic policy,
Shiller first proposes replacing the current income tax with what he calls
"inequality insurance"--in effect, a means of locking in the current level
of inequality via annual adjustments to the tax schedule.' 7 Second, he
suggests replacing the current pay-as-you go social security system with
a tax that varies with the percentage of retirees in the population. 8
Finally, he argues for replacing the existing money system with units of
account indexed to the price of a representative basket of goods and
services.' 9 With respect to foreign policy, Shiller proposes replacing (or
at least augmenting) the typical foreign aid program with a system
whereby countries or blocks of counties would swap unexpected
changes in GDP; he calls the swaps "international agreements for risk
control."20 Like his private sector ideas, Shiller's public sector ideas
also face obstacles to implementation. The most obvious would seem to
be political or institutional: particularly in the areas of tax and social
security, economic ideas are closely intertwined with the political
process-a process as fallible, imperfect and unpredictable as the
humans who make up legislatures and constituencies. Shiller has little
to say about politics or institutions, and the feasibility of his public
sector ideas suffers accordingly.
This review proceeds as follows. Part I deals with Shiller's private
sector ideas. In this part, I first describe Shiller's ideas relating to
"insurance" (broadly construed)-livelihood insurance, home equity
insurance and income-linked loans. Part II discuss the three problems
besetting the private sector ideas, and Shiller's proposed solutions:
macro securities for hedging, GRIDs for information and indexes for
moral hazard and adverse selection. Part II continues with a discussion
of the effect of indexes on the operation of various legal doctrines, a
topic Shiller does not address. Part II concludes with suggestions for
implementation of the private sector ideas. Part HI deals with Shiller's
vision for the public sector. In this Part, I first describe and critique
Shiller's tax and social security proposals. Next, I discuss his proposed
international agreements for risk control. Then I treat the idea of
17. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 149-64.
18. See id. at 165-74.
19. See id. at 202-21.
20. See id. at 175-85.
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indexed units of account. The theme unifying Part III is that even the
best economic ideas have to contend with the often cumbersome realities
of the political process. A brief conclusion offers some thoughts on
reading NFO.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that NFO presents an unusual
subject for a book review. The book does not enter the fray of an
ongoing debate or offer incremental refinements of existing ideas.
Rather, it proposes a wholesale reworking of our assumptions and
institutions in the conviction that financial ideas can improve fairness
and efficiency in society. Regarding fairness, Shiller asserts early in the
book that "[t]he primary subject matter of finance is the management of
risks. 21 As such, the tools of finance can help solve the problem of
gratuitous inequality, that is, inequality that cannot be justified on
rational grounds in terms of differences in effort or talent.22 Regarding
efficiency, risk aversion implies that there are efficiency gains from
insurance. As a result, Shiller, seeks to realize those gains to the
maximum extent feasible by expanding the scope of insurance. For
example, the introduction of indexes to settle certain types of insurance
contracts would enable insurers to offer products that informed
consumers might want, but currently cannot purchase.
In short, Shiller sets ambitious goals for himself in NFO. The chief
success of NFO consists not in achieving those goals, per se, but in
pointing the way toward solutions. The book covers a lot of territory,
sometimes at the expense of depth and clarity. The target audience is by
no means clear: a financial novice will find insufficient exposition, and
an expert will find insufficient detail.23 Anyone interested in a fuller
understanding of the ideas in NFO will have to look beyond the book,
perhaps to related scholarship by Shiller and others. However, NFO
21. Id. at 1.
22. See id. at 2. Rawls therefore provides the philosophic underpinning of Shiller's
new financial order. The book approaches economic equality from a Rawlsian "original
position," asking "[W]hat kind of world, in the broad picture, we would we like to live
in if we could choose before we were born, assuming we had an equal probability of
being born as anyone?" SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 17.
Though Shiller does not share Rawls' assumption that people are infinitely risk
averse-the basis for Rawls' "maximin" principle-Shiller does assume some degree of
risk aversion.
23. The rhythm of the text is also interrupted by a number of typos and
grammatical faux-pas; Princeton University Press should have been more careful.
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succeeds in conveying a powerful sense of the creative potential of
financial innovation. It leaves the reader eager to learn and participate.
I. PRIVATE SECTOR IDEAS
This Part describes each of Shiller's private sector risk management
ideas-livelihood insurance, home equity insurance and income-linked
loans. The next Part discusses the problems with each of these ideas,
and Shiller's solutions. It also explores potential ramifications of
indexes for the operation of law and possible methods for implementing
the ideas.
A. Livelihood Insurance
Our ability to earn income constitutes one of our most important
assets, yet today no method exists for insuring occupational incomes.24
Therefore, investment of time and money in the specialized knowledge
required for many careers involves the risk that the career category will
disappear (e.g., will go overseas or will be outmoded by new
technology) and the specialized knowledge will be rendered useless.25
At the margin, the presence of this risk prevents potentially qualified
people from pursuing cutting edge careers, and inhibits the development
of society's collective talents.26
To mitigate that risk, Shiller suggests that private insurance
companies could write policies that would insure occupational incomes,
with contract settlement based at least in part on an income index
arranged by occupation or other characteristics. 27  For example, in
exchange for a premium,28 a policy might pay the insured 50 percent of
the decline in the average income of a person who started in the
insured's field, and 50 percent of the decline in the insured's income
below a floor specified in the policy, with the second 50 percent
24. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 10.
25. See id. at 107-10.
26. See id.
27. Seeid. at 111.
28. The premium might be a fraction of future income, a fixed annual indexed sum,
or an up-front premium which might be borrowed against future income, presumably in
the form of an income-linked loan, as described below. See SHILLER, THE NEW
FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 109.
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contingent on the insured remaining fully employed or going back to
school for retraining.29  Consider a young scientist-call her "A"-
specializing in recombinant DNA technology (Shiller uses the same
field to illustrate his idea). Assume that the average income of those
who started in the field is $50,000 per year, and A makes the average
income. A, or her employer or union on her behalf, could purchase a
policy like the one described above: she would get 50% of the fall in the
average income of DNA scientists below $40,000, and 50% of the
decline in her personal income below $30,000. Now assume that
universities continue to substitute lower-paid postdoctoral appointments
for regular positions, and as a result the average income of those who
started as recombinant DNA technologists falls the next year to $25,000
(ignoring, for the moment, inflation and income from other sources).
Our scientist continues to work in her field, and her income falls with
the average. Under this scenario, the policy would pay our scientist
$10,000 in that year.30
The livelihood insurance proposed by Shiller would constitute a
regular and recurring supplement to declining income rather than a one-
time payout in the event of unemployment.3' In this sense, livelihood
insurance resembles a short position in a futures contract settled on the
index of occupational incomes.32 The insurance company might fund
29. This example is included here to illustrate, rather than exhaust, the possible
structures of livelihood insurance contracts.
30. ([40,000 - 25,000]/2) + ([30,000 - 25,000]/2).
31. Shiller does not address the interaction of livelihood insurance with
unemployment insurance. In order for the former not to undermine the latter,
regulations would have to specify that unemployment benefits are not offset by any
livelihood insurance payments. That is, a "collateral source rule" should govern the
interaction of unemployment benefits and livelihood insurance. See MARC A. FRANKLIN
& ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 746-47 (Foundation Press 7th ed.
2001) (describing the collateral source rule).
32. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR
MANAGING SOCIETY'S LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS vi (Clarendon Series; Oxford Univ.
Press 1993) [hereinafter SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS].
A futures market... can be described as a market for bets on the course of the price
or index that defines the market; the primary purpose of these markets is not to enable
people to gamble but to 'hedge', to make offsetting bets, to cancel out the bets that
they have already found themselves making due to their economic circumstances.
Id. The analogy, however, is not symmetrical: the insured would not be required to pay
the insurer if the index went up, so the insurer should not be analogized to the "long"
party to a futures contract.
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periodic payments to the insured via offsetting positions in macro
markets for occupational incomes.3 Importantly, the insured does not
have to leave his or her field to collect livelihood insurance proceeds.34
As the above example demonstrates, the viability of livelihood
insurance depends crucially on the ability of governments and private
companies to work together to design and implement accurate
occupational income indexes, as well as the creation of hedging
institutions in which insurers can lay off risk.35 The indexes proposed
by Shiller would measure through time the incomes of individuals who
begin in a certain occupation, regardless of whether such individuals
remain in that occupation.36 Such an index design incorporates the
recognition that individuals in a declining occupation may substitute to
other occupations. The reach and precision of livelihood insurance can
be enhanced through the use of indexes based on job history, education,
general income level or, more controversially, genetic make-up.37
33. Macro markets are described below. See infra Part II.A. Generally, insurance
companies use stock and derivative markets to hedge the risk undertaken by writing
policies. For example, an insurer who writes commercial general liability policies for
financial services firms may also take a short position in an index of financial stocks. If
things go bad in the financial services industry, the insurance company will be obligated
to make payouts under the policies. But at the same time, the index will decline, and
therefore the short position will increase in value. The increase in value of the short
position (inflow) should offset the payouts (outflow). Also note that whereas the
increase in value of the short position in the index is immediate, the payout under the
policy is delayed, sometimes for years (this is particularly the case for reinsurers, which
essentially are insurers that insure other insurance companies). Between the time of the
loss and the time of any ultimate payout under a policy, the insurance company can earn
income on its invested premiums. Therefore, insurance companies can remain
profitable even at loss ratios in excess of 100 percent. (The "loss ratio" describes the
relationship of an insurance company's incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses to
its earned premiums.)
34. Thus, while livelihood insurance may be analogized to a short position in a
futures contract, it should not be compared to a put option on the income index with a
strike price equal to the income floor. See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 642-47 (McGraw Hill Irwin 4th ed. 2004).
35. See infra Part II.A (discussing macro markets).
36. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 111.
37. See id. at 113-14.
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B. Home Equity Insurance
For many people, homes are the single largest asset. However, no
method exists today for insuring against declines in the price of a
home.38 Shiller therefore proposes home equity insurance to insure the
market values of individual homes, with settlement based at least in part
on an index of the prices of homes of similar location and quality.39 To
ensure that such indexes are reasonable proxies for the price experience
of individual homes, the indexes would have to be narrowly tailored in
terms of geographic region.40 At the same time, to counter moral hazard
(described below), the data sets on which the indexes are based would
have to be large enough so that no single homeowner could materially
affect the performance of an index.4' The art and science of index
design consists in striking a balance between these competing
concerns. 41 Shiller speaks with particular authority on the design of
indexes for risk management: in 1991, along with Karl E. Case and
Allan Weiss, Shiller founded Case Shiller Weiss, Inc., a for-profit
company to create new measures of price appreciation by zip code and
home value tier in the United States.43
Sale of the insured's home would not be a condition for
collection-just as unemployment would not be a condition for
collection of livelihood insurance-thus mitigating the problems of
strategic selling and strategic cancellation."4 Instead, home equity
policies would pay out in any period in which the value of the applicable
index fell below a predetermined level. Therefore, similar to livelihood
insurance, home equity insurance would resemble a short position in a
futures contract settled on the applicable index of home prices. 45 Home
38. Home prices do not always go up. See BARRY J. NALEBUFF & IAN AYRES, WHY
NOT? How To USE EVERYDAY INGENUITY To SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG AND SMALL 53
(Harv. Bus. Sch. Press 2003) ("Between 1985 and 2000, nearly 10 percent of American
home owners lived in a region in which home prices declined during the time they lived
there.").
39. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 119.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 120.
43. See id. at 11.
44. See id. at 119.
45. See SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS, supra note 32, at vi.
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equity insurers would, in theory, be able to make regular payouts by
hedging home price risk in macro markets for real estate.46
C. Income-Linked Loans
Linking loan repayments to the vagaries of the borrower's fortunes
goes back at least as far as Milton Friedman's 1962 book Capitalism
and Freedom.47 There, Friedman speculated on the possibility of
applying to education financing the model of stock market financing
used by corporations: "The counterpart for education would be to 'buy'
a share in an individual's earnings prospects; to advance him the funds
needed to finance his training on condition that he agree to pay the
lender a specified fraction of future earnings. '4' Friedman doubted the
practicability of income-linked loans, calling the idea an "amusing"
speculation and citing the likelihood of irrational public condemnation
and high administration costs. 49 In NFO, Shiller seeks to rejuvenate
Friedman's core idea and to expand its scope.50
Under Shiller's proposal, lenders-including banks, mortgage
originators and governments-could offer to individuals, corporations
and other governments long-term loans with repayment terms defined in
terms of the borrower's income or an index of incomes of similar
borrowers, or some combination of the two.51 Instead of competing on
interest rates and points, lenders might compete on the proportion of
borrower-specific income and index income required for repayment, and
Someone who is a holder of real estate (that is, who is 'long' in the 'cash market') can
in effect place a bet that real estate prices will go down (that is, can go 'short' in the
futures market). Then, should real estate prices indeed fall, the winnings in the
futures market would cancel out the losses in the real estate market.... Hedging in
such markets is essentially the same as buying insurance against price declines.
Id. Here the home itself might take the place of margin balance required by futures
exchanges.
46. See infra Part II.A (discussing macro markets). See also SHILLER, THE NEW
FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 119.
47. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5 at 139.
48. Id. at 139-40 (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 103
(Univ. Chi. Press 2d ed.1982) (1962)).
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
725
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on the index to be applied in defining repayment terms.5 2 Shiller notes
that income-linked loans would reduce (though not eliminate) the risk of
bankruptcy. He therefore concludes that the bankruptcy code should be
amended to prohibit the discharge of income-linked loans in bankruptcy,
just as the code prohibits discharge of certain student loans. 3
II. PRIVATE SECTOR IDEAS-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Shiller's private sector ideas are beset by three categories of
problems, and Shiller offers a solution for each. First, insurers need a
way to hedge the risks taken on by writing policies, and banks need a
way to lay off the risk that borrowers will default on loans. Shiller
solves the "hedging" problem by proposing macro markets for trading
the largest income flows and asset prices.5 4 Second, the information
required to create the products does not exist in any existing database.
Accordingly, Shiller calls for the creation of giant databases containing
the necessary information. 5 Third, the insurance products would have
to contend with the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. As
a countermeasure, Shiller submits that indexes can be created and used
to settle insurance contracts and set loan repayment terms.5 6 This part
assesses each of Shiller's proposed solutions. In particular, this part
explores in some depth the implications of indexes for insurance markets
and law-topics Shiller mentions only in passing. This part concludes
with thoughts on implementation of the insurance ideas, based largely
52. For example, one lender might require the borrower to pay each year for thirty
years five percent of her income and five percent of an income index, while another
lender might require the borrower to pay ten percent of an index. Likewise, a lender
might define a borrower's repayment schedule in terms of the borrower's occupation or
location. See id. at 141.
53. See id. at 147. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2003) (restricting the
dischargeability of educational benefits or loans which were insured or guaranteed by a
governmental unit or under any program funded by a governmental unit or nonprofit
institution); Santa Fe Med. Services, Inc. v. Segal, 57 F.3d 342, 33 C.B.C.2d 1496 (3d
Cir. 1995) (explaining that the participants in educational loan programs, whether
lenders or guarantors, grant credit to persons who might not qualify for credit under
traditional credit standards, in order to foster the government's policy of promoting
access to educational opportunities).
54. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5 at 123-24.
55. See id. at 189-90.
56. See id. at 190.
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on recent scholarship on "asymmetric paternalism" or "libertarian
paternalism" (both discussed below).
A. Hedging and Macro Markets
Macro markets play a crucial role in Shiller's new risk management
infrastructure. Macro securities themselves (discussed in a moment) are
a versatile risk management tool. In addition, macro markets provide an
essential hedging institution for insurers writing livelihood or home
equity insurance17 and lenders making income-linked loans.58  Macro
securities should also facilitate the structuring of intergenerational social
security5 9 and international agreements for risk control.60
For over a decade, Shiller has been thinking about the design of
institutions for trading macro risks. In his 1993 book Macro Markets,
Shiller proposed that such trading could be accomplished through the
use of what he there called "perpetual futures.' Perpetual futures
would resemble index-settled futures traded on existing markets, such as
57. See supra Part L.A (describing livelihood insurance) and Part I.B (describing
home equity insurance). Shiller notes that "[i]f these retail insurance products were
introduced after macro markets for real estate were created, then insurance companies
could hedge themselves in the macro markets for the risks that they took on by writing
home equity insurance policies for individuals." See id. at 119.
58. See infra Part I.C (describing income-linked loans). Shiller notes that
"[b]orrowers guided by sound financial advice from their financial planner, their
employer, or their labor union might even use the loan to buy a portfolio of macro
securities that provided income that helps protect them against possible declines in their
household income." See id. at 141.
59. See Robert J. Shiller, Social Security and Institutions for Intergenerational,
Intragenerational, and International Risk Sharing, in 50 CARNEGIE ROCHESTER
CONFERENCE SERIES ON PUBLIC POLICY 165, 169 (1999) ("The creation of the
international macro markets might even solve most of the risk-management problem
that social security is designed to deal with, and produce a greater welfare improvement
than would the optimum social security system without these markets.").
60. See infra Part III.E (describing international agreements for risk control). For
example, a country could short its own GDP in the macro markets and purchase a long
position in the GDPs of other nations, in effect swapping its own national income risk
for a better diversified portfolio of national incomes. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL
ORDER, supra note 5, at 123. Similarly, in specifying GDP expectations for the design
of international agreements for risk control, macro securities based on GDP could
provide useful guidance. See id. at 178.
61. See SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS, supra note 32, at 5.
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the Chicago Board of Trade, with two related exceptions: the daily
settlement formula would be different and the contracts would have no
expiration date.62  Each day the short party to a perpetual futures
contract would pay the long party an amount roughly equal to the excess
of the return on the index over the return on the alternative asset
(probably short-term government debt).63 In effect, the short party
would be swapping the risk of a long-term claim on the index for the
return on the alternative asset.64
Shiller recognizes that the complexity of perpetual futures threatens
65to undermine their utility as risk management devices. Most people
are unfamiliar with futures contracts and may be put off by margin
requirements and margin calls.66 Macro securities-an idea Shiller has
patented-are designed to serve the same risk management function as
futures contracts but in a more user-friendly format. In their simplest
form, macro securities would work as follows. A stock exchange or
other entity would automatically issue pairs of macro securities-an "up
macro" and a "down macro"--whenever it received matching orders.6 7
62. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 302 n.4. With
respect to daily settlement, the long and short parties to a conventional futures contract
have contracts with the exchange rather than with one another. To prevent default, the
exchange requires each party to post collateral in a margin account to cover any losses.
If the collateral in a margin account falls below a specified level, the broker contacts the
account holder to request that more money be added to the account. Such a request is
known as a "margin call." If the account holder does not respond immediately, the
broker liquidates the account holder's futures position at the prevailing market price and
returns to the holder any excess collateral. At the end of each trading day, all accounts
are "marked to market" based on that day's settlement prices. That is, if today's
settlement price is higher than yesterday's, money is transferred from the margin
account of the short party to the exchange, and from the exchange to the margin account
of the long party. If the contract settles lower, the margin balance is shifted via the
exchange from the account of the long party to the account of the short party. See also
Zvi BODE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 361-63 (Prentice Hall 1993).
63. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 302 n.4.
64. See id. For a fuller description of perpetual futures, see SHILLER, MACRO
MARKETS, supra note 32, at 42-46.
65. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 126.
66. See id. ("Most people are unfamiliar with futures contracts and do not like to
have to deal with margin requirements and margin calls.").
67. Although macro securities must be issued and redeemed only in pairs of "up
macros" and "down macros," following issuance, the two components of a pair may
trade separately, at different prices. See id. at 126-27.
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The up macro would be designed so that its price moved up when the
index moved up, and the down macro would be designed so that its price
moved down when the index moved up.68 Each security would have a
cash account that would be adjusted daily in accordance with the index,
and each security would pay dividends, probably quarterly, equal to the
interest on its cash account. 69
Shiller provides the following helpful illustration. Assume that a
pair of macro securities is issued for $100 each when the GDP index is
scaled to equal 100. The purchase price of each of the up and down
macros goes into its associated cash account. If the index moves to 102,
the custodian moves $2 from the down macro cash account to the up
macro cash account. Similarly, if the index falls to 97 (from 100), the
custodian moves $3 from the up macro cash account to the down macro
cash account.70 Each macro pays dividends equal to the interest on its
cash account.7' Therefore, buying an up macro corresponds to a long
position in the index, while buying a down macro corresponds to a short
position in the index, plus the value of the down macro cash account
balance.72 Importantly, transfers between cash accounts would take
place daily (like daily marking to market of futures contracts), whereas
the dividend payments would occur less frequently, presumably
quarterly. The prices of macro securities would anticipate the index but
would not track the index directly. Prices of macro securities thus
would represent the present value of future claims on the underlying
index. For instance, if most investors expected GDP to fall, the price of
down macros would increase. Investors would value such claims
differently, thereby facilitating trading.73
Macro markets hold a central place in Shiller's new financial order.
Without them, home equity and livelihood insurers and income-linked
lenders could not adequately hedge their risks, and Shiller's public-
sector ideas would be harder to implement. It is therefore curious that in
68. See id. at 126.
69. See id. at 127.
70. Note that after interest is paid, the total amount in the two cash accounts in this
example always equals $200. See id.
71. See id.
72. See U.S. Patent No. 5,987,453 (issued Nov. 17, 1999) (providing helpful
examples of how macro securities-or "proxy assets," as they are called therein-
would work).
73. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 127-28.
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his macro markets chapter-the longest chapter in Part III of NFO-
Shiller dedicates only one short paragraph to a major potential problem:
speculation.74 Shiller has written convincingly about the propensity of
speculation to undermine the efficiency of securities markets and to
thwart markets' risk management potential.75 If investors have a
tendency to speculate in the stocks of corporations about which they
know relatively little,76 it stands to reason that investors will speculate
even more-with more deleterious long-term consequences-in
securities based on items about which they (often mistakenly) think they
know relatively more, such as incomes in their occupations and property
values in their neighborhoods. Thus, in markets for securities based on
income streams that are "close to home," "noise trading" can be a
serious problem.77 Similarly, the tendency toward "herd behavior"
characteristic of speculative bubbles 78 may be even more pronounced
when investors can talk to their colleagues and neighbors about macro
securities based on incomes or home values. Moreover, patriotic
sentiment or national "triumphalism" following good events in one
country or bad events in another may exacerbate speculation in macro
securities based on GDP.79 Shiller emphasizes that efficient macro
securities markets can provide a useful guidance function for people
choosing occupations or neighborhoods, and for governments designing
international agreements for risk control.80  However, people or
governments looking to speculative markets for direction may be
seriously misguided.
Another problem involves the integrity and reliability of the data
underlying macro securities prices. The recent spate of corporate
accounting scandals in the United States demonstrates that securities
74. See id. at 137.
75. See SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 2, at 203-07
76. See id. at 203 (noting that very few people "feel the need to perform careful
research on the long-term investment value of the aggregate stock market").
77. See J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J.
POL. ECON. 703, 704 (1990) (stating that "noise traders" irrationally believe they
possess valuable information, and invest accordingly).
78. See SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 2, at 148-68 (describing
and documenting "herd behavior").
79. See id. at 21-22, 228.
80. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 131-33, 178.
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prices are only as good as the data on which they are based."' Take the
example of macro securities based on GDP. Shiller argues that GDP
would be the most important income flow traded in macro markets
because GDP is the broadest existing index of economic risk.82 Ideally,
countries could hedge GDP risk via short sales in macro markets, or by
purchasing "down macros" on their GDPs; gains from any decline in the
country's GDP could be used to purchase a portfolio of long positions in
the GDPs of other countries.8 3 However, so long as macro securities
prices depend on GDP, countries may have a strategic interest in
misrepresenting GDP. For example, countries with a short position in
securities based on their GDPs could profit by shading GDP figures
down. More specifically, individual political leaders-particularly in
smaller countries with fewer economic freedoms-may have an
incentive to skew GDP figures according to their personal holdings, or
to force others to do so. Therefore, macro securities may engender
corruption.
Even if securities prices are based on reliable GDP figures, the
problem of "insider trading" remains.8 4 Politicians, government officials
and corporate officers may have "material nonpublic information"
regarding the direction of national incomes. Only adequate securities
regulation can inhibit "insider trading" based on such information, but
Shiller does not specify who would police macro markets.8 5 National
securities regulators, like the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, probably do not have resources sufficient to monitor huge
macro markets.8 6 By the same token, international securities regulators
81. See generally ALEX BERENSON, THE NUMBER: How THE DRIVE FOR
QUARTERLY EARNINGS CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA i-XXiV
(Random House 2003).
82. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 129.
83. See id.
84. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
945 (3d ed. 2001) (defining "insider trading" as "a term of art referring generally to any
unlawful trading by persons possessing material nonpublic information, whether or not
the trader is truly a corporate 'insider"').
85. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 175 (stating that
"an international agency" could coordinate between countries but not identifying which
agency).
86. See Stephen Labaton, In Stormy Time, S.E.C. Is Facing Deeper Trouble, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002 (reporting that officials close to the S.E.C. say that the enforcement
staff lacks resources).
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may face problems in terms of jurisdiction, coordination and
enforcement.87
Finally, Shiller may underestimate the public resistance to novel
financial markets based on politically and emotionally charged events-
swings in GDP, changes in occupational incomes and housing prices.
We have a recent precedent. In summer 2003, the Pentagon's Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) tried to create a futures
market in which investors could take small positions settled on the
occurrence or non-occurrence of specified political events in the Middle
East.88 Immediately, politicians and the news media framed the plan as
a "betting parlor."' 9  Politicians sought to outdo one another in
denunciation, and the plan was quickly "terminated." 90 In a series of
postmortems, some reputable economists concluded that the program
87. See generally Patricia A. McCoy, Musings on the Seeming Inevitability of
Global Convergence in Banking Law, 7 CoNN. INS. L.J. 433, 443 (2000).
88. See Carl Hulse, Threats and Responses: Plans and Criticisms; Pentagon
Prepares a Futures Market on Terror Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at Al.
89. See Paul Courson & Steve Tumham, Amidfuror, Pentagon Kills Market, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/O7/29/terror.market/ (last visited Feb. 24,
2004) (quoting Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon who called the plan "a federal betting
parlor on atrocities and terrorism").
90. For example Senator Byron Dorgan of North Dakota called it "unbelievably
stupid." See CBS/AP, Betting on Terror, at
http://www.cbsnews.comstories/2003/07129/attack/main565655.shtml (last visited Feb.
24, 2004). Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota offered, "I must say this is perhaps
the most irresponsible, outrageous and poorly thought-out of anything that I have heard
the administration propose to date." Carl Hulse, Pentagon Abandons Plan for Futures
Market on Terror (July 29, 2003), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/29/politics/29WIRE-
PENT.html?ex=1078290000&en=6acab82abObd9628&ei=5070 (last visited Feb. 29,
2004). And Senator Barbara Boxer of California opined, "There is something very sick
about it... [a]nd if it's going to end, I think you ought to end the careers of whoever it
was thought that up." Ken Guggenheim, Pentagon Cancels Terrorism Betting Plan,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 29, 2003, available at
http://www.seacoastonline.con/2003news/07302003/world/42296.htn (last visited Feb.
24, 2004). Others concurred with Senator Boxer's sentiments. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt,
Poindexter Will Be Quitting Over Terrorist Futures Debacle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003,
at All (reporting that retired rear admiral John M. Poindexter, Ronald Reagan's
national security adviser and the Pentagon official who oversaw the development of the
futures market, was "resigning under pressure").
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was a good economic idea stymied by bad press.9 At a minimum, the
episode suggests that public relations could be as important as
economics in selling macro markets to the investing public.92
B. Information and Global Risk Information Databases
Information technology, Shiller argues, provides the critical
infrastructure through which financial innovation can help enhance
efficiency and mitigate gratuitous inequality.93 All of the ideas in NFO
require vast amounts of financial information about individuals,
organizations and assets, but that information does not exist today in a
workable and reliable form. Accordingly, Shiller proposes the creation
of global risk information databases to provide "finely detailed,
continuously updated, widely available data on incomes and asset prices
as well as aggregated data on these and other values relevant to the risks
faced by individuals, organizations, corporations, and governments." 94
GRIDs would be the product of joint public-private initiative. On
the public side, governments would have two main roles. First,
governments would have to establish a legal framework. Such a
framework would include rules regarding permitted, prohibited and
mandatory information on GRIDs, rules on enforcement of contracts
settled based on GRIDs, and, importantly, rules regarding privacy of
information on GRIDs and remedies for violations of privacy rules.95
Second, governments might have to subsidize the gathering of the
information on GRIDs. 96 Once governments have set standards and put
in place the infrastructure for collecting the relevant information, private
companies could develop competing systems for accessing and using
91. See Hal R. Varian, Economic Scene; A Market in Terrorism Indicators Was a
Good Idea; It Just Got Bad Publicity, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at C2.; see also Justin
Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, The Furor Over "Terrorism Futures ", WASH. POST, July 31,
2003, at A19.
92. See Varian, supra note 91.
93. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 2.
94. Id. at 189-90.
95. See id. at 191.
96. See id.
7332004]
734 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. IX
FINANCIAL LAW
GRIDs.9 7 In addition, private firms could develop and refine the
technology used to guard the information on GRIDs.98
Shiller describes the range of information that may be collected on
GRIDs and suggests some potential applications. GRIDs could store
complete and current information on the incomes (and components and
correlates of incomes) of individuals, families, corporations and
governments.99 In this sense, GRIDs would simply expand the scope
and application of information already provided, in the United States, to
the Internal Revenue Service (in the case of individuals and
corporations) and to the Securities and Exchange Commission (in the
case of corporations).'0 At the government level, income information
on GRIDs could be used to refine national income or GDP figures, and
could be used to compute alternative definitions of national income.0 1
As for applications, Shiller suggests that GRIDs could be integrated
with the current tax system or with his proposed inequality insurance.0 2
Such integration, according to Shiller, would permit the tax system to
become substantially more complicated without imposing additional
compliance costs on taxpayers; the tax system could thereby function
more effectively as a risk management device. Also, GRIDs could
facilitate charitable giving and simplify estate planning.'0 3
Shiller notes in passing that the information gathered in GRIDs
would be public goods, but does not elaborate on the point." Public
goods have two main characteristics: non-rivalry of consumption and
non-excludability of benefits. Non-rivalry of consumption means that
consumption of the good by one person does not diminish the
opportunities of others to consume the same good. Non-excludability of
benefits means it is prohibitively costly to prevent people who have not
97. See id. at 192 (explaining that GRIDs should be designed with a standard "data
socket"--or protocol for accessing the data-so that private software designers could
compete on product features that are important to end users. By analogy, all stereos
made for use in the United States have the same type of plug to put into a power outlet,
permitting stereo makers to compete on items more important to consumers, such as
sound quality, features and appearance).
98. See id.
99. See id. at 193-94.
100. See id. at 194-98.
101. See id. at 194.
102. See infra Parts III.A and III.C.
103. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER supra note 5, at 199-201.
104. See id. at 191.
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paid for the good from consuming it.'°5 Provision of public goods by
private firms would be subject to the free rider problem: most people
would consume the good without paying for it. Thus, private firms
would under-produce public goods. Where the market fails to provide
valuable public goods, the government provides them or subsidizes their
provision by a private finn-and charges the consumers via the tax
system.1
0 6
A common example is national defense. To evaluate the
workability of GRIDs, a better example might be Coase's lighthouse.
0 7
In a classic study, Coase showed that lighthouse services in Britain and
Wales were financed by tolls levied on ships and collected at ports by
agents of Trinity House, the lighthouse authority. The government's
role was limited to the establishment and enforcement of property rights
in lighthouses. The problems faced by Trinity House in enforcing
lighthouse dues were no different than for private suppliers of goods and
services to ship owners. 108 By analogy, the information in GRIDs may
be understood as a "lighthouse good." The government would collect
(or subsidize the collection of) the information,'0 9 then, presumably, sell
the raw data to database and index designers. One would expect these
buyers to include the institutions that design and market risk
management products to end users. Thus, the end users of the
information would pay for it, and finance the initial information
gathering.
The GRID idea seems to make economic sense. Yet in practice, the
information gathering entailed in the proposal may encounter a big
political hurdle: privacy. Shiller acknowledges the necessity of ensuring
privacy of the information on the GRIDs and seems sanguine that
statutes and technology can do the job."0 Other devices not mentioned
105. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory
of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1466 n. 42 (2002).
106. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 42-43 (3d ed.
2000).
107. See R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND
THE LAW 187 (1988).
108. See id.
109. Shiller suggests that universities, funded in part by the government, could
sponsor the collection of data. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5,
at 225-26.
110. See id. at 191-92.
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by Shiller-including the threat of common law remedies, contracts and
norms-may be employed to protect private information on GRIDs.'"
But even with layers of protections, human error remains. Witness the
recent privacy fiasco at Jet Blue.1 2 Moreover, the conventional ex post
remedies for negligence, breaches of contract and statutory violations
may be insufficient to cabin the damage of a wrongful sharing of private
information. More important than the actual threat of harm from privacy
breaches is the subjective fear of breaches and resulting harm, especially
where genetic information is concerned." 3 Most people underestimate
their individual risk of adverse events: to them, the immediate disutility
of sharing private information may outweigh the uncertain and
attenuated benefits of long-term risk management. Privacy advocates
may exaggerate the likelihood of unauthorized sharing or the magnitude
of the resulting harm, thereby exacerbating people's distaste for sharing.
Support for the necessary information gathering could be politically
untenable, and without government intervention, the private information
on which GRIDs are based could not be produced at the requisite scale.
C. Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Indexes
To understand how Shiller's indexes would affect insurance
markets, we need to review the operation of insurance markets. This
section first describes the conventional explanation of the demand for
insurance, then discusses moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral
hazard may be described as the tendency of insureds to invest less in
loss prevention as more of their losses are covered by insurance."'
111. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 231-347
(1983).
112. See Susan Carey & Stephen Power, Responding to Privacy Concerns, Jet Blue
E-Mails an Explanation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at B3 (reporting that customers
and privacy advocates were incensed that Jet Blue provided passenger itinerary
information to a Defense Department Contractor for a nonairline security project).
113. See 2003 Privacy Trust Survey, PONEMON INSTITUTE & THE CIO INSTITUTE OF
CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIVERSITY (Oct. 31, 2003) (measuring U.S. citizens' confidence
in business and government organizations to safeguard personal information).
114. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of
Medical Care, 53 AMER. ECON. REV. 941 (1963); Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of
Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REV. 237 (1996) (surveying the intellectual history of the
term "moral hazard"); George Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987) (distinguishing between ex ante and ex post
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Adverse selection may be defined as "the proclivity for people of greater
than average risk to purchase greater than average amounts of
insurance." 15 Shiller's proposed insurance products must contend with
these issues. As this section argues, index-based settlement can go a
long way toward eliminating moral hazard and adverse selection in
certain insurance markets.16 As such, index-based settlement may well
be the most significant innovation in NFO.
1. Insurance Demand
To determine whether people will demand livelihood and home
equity insurance, we first need to understand why people demand any
kind of insurance. The economic theory of insurance demand is a story
of risk aversion: people prefer a lower certain income to a higher
uncertain income." 7  For example, consider long-term disability
insurance. Assume A is self-employed, and makes $100,000 per year.
A estimates that there is a 5% chance this year that because of injury or
sickness, he will not be able to work; if he does not work he earns no
income, and A has no income from other sources. Therefore, the
expected monetary value (or more accurately, cost) of long term
disability is ($-100,000 x 0.05) + ($0 x 0.95) = -$5000. Assuming A is
risk averse, he would prefer to pay an insurance premium of slightly
more than $5,000 to avoid the risk of loss of his entire income. 18
The assumption that people are risk averse is based on the declining
marginal utility of wealth: as wealth increases, the utility of incremental
moral hazard: "Ex ante moral hazard is the reduction in precautions taken by the
insured to prevent the loss, because of the existence of the insurance. Ex post moral
hazard is the increase in claims against the insurance policy beyond the services the
claimant would purchase if not insured.") (emphasis in original).
115. Seth J. Chandler, Visualizing Adverse Selection: An Economic Approach to the
Law of Insurance Underwriting, 8 CONN. INs. L.J. 435, 436 (2002).
116. In the interest of parsimony, this section analyzes the incentives created by
settlement based entirely on an index. However, as noted above, certain of Shiller's
proposals contemplate settlement based partially on an index and partially on individual
experience. The greater the proportion of individual experience involved in settling
policies, the greater the potential for moral hazard and adverse selection to undermine
the workability of the proposals.
117. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 106, at 49-50.
118. See id.
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wealth also increases, but at a decreasing rate." 9  For example, an
additional $1,000 will add more to one's total utility if one's wealth is
$10,000 than if one's wealth is $40,000.120 Since additional wealth is
worth relatively more when wealth is lower, it follows that people would
want to "ship" wealth from states of the world (i.e., personal economic
circumstances) where wealth is high to states where it is low. Insurance
may be understood as the vehicle by which wealth is shipped from high-
wealth (and low utility) to low-wealth (and high utility) states of the
world.' 2 ' Returning to A, in a no-accident, no-sickness state of the
world, A's wealth is high and the cost of the premium (in utility terms)
is low. If A gets sick or is injured, A's wealth falls, and the utility of the
payout under the disability policy is quite high.
The economic theory of insurance demand predicts that any risk
averse person will purchase full insurance so long as it is priced at the
actuarially fair premium. 122 In fact, the prediction is almost tautological:
risk aversion may be defined as the insured's willingness to purchase
119. But see Matthew Rabin, Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth Cannot
Explain Risk Aversion, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 202 (Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, eds., 2000) (arguing that "economists often reach misleading
conclusions by invoking expected-utility theory to explain substantial risk aversion in
contexts in which the theory actually predicts virtual risk neutrality").
120. Declining marginal utility of wealth usually is illustrated by a curve concave to
the origin. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 106, at 47.
121. See generally Jack Hirshleifer, Investment Decisions Under Uncertainty:
Applications of the State Preference Approach, 80 Q.J. ECON. 252, 253 (1966).
122. In the absence of market imperfections, the actuarially fair premium will be
slightly in excess of the insured's expected loss. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM,
DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 11 (Yale Univ.
Press 1986). In addition, premiums could contain a useful informational component:
the prices of livelihood and home equity insurance premiums, which themselves would
be closely related to indexes, could provide valuable information to people deciding
which occupations to enter or where to buy a home. See Goran Skogh, The Transaction
Cost Theory of Insurance: Contracting Impediments and Cost, 56 J. RISK & INS. 726,
727-28 (1989) (observing that an important function of insurance companies is to
monitor and price risks, and therefore insurance premiums contain information
regarding risk of loss and avoidance costs). Shiller observes that that the price of macro
securities can send important signals about the underlying asset or income flow-jobs,
home values, national income-but he does not make this point about insurance
premiums. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 133.
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full insurance at the actuarially fair premium. 123 If insurance is
underpriced, people may purchase too much insurance and not invest
enough in loss prevention methods such as safety precautions or
reduction of production or activity levels. If insurance is overpriced,
people may purchase too little insurance and invest too much in loss
prevention. 24
Of course, these predictions, and the economic theory of the
demand for insurance, assume that individuals are fully rational, and can
predict with reasonable accuracy their individual probability and
magnitude of loss: a potential insured can only compare the premium to
his expected loss if he knows his expected loss.2'2  However, individuals
are not always fully rational. Research in the overlapping fields of
cognitive psychology and behavioral economics suggests that at least in
some contexts, individuals exhibit bounded rationality, bounded will
power and bounded self-interest.1 21 People are overconfident and
underestimate the probability that bad things will happen to them,
especially when risks accumulate gradually over long periods of time;
people's choices often are strongly influenced by the way the choices
are framed; and people are seriously limited in their ability to accuratzly
estimate probabilities.127  Specifically, in the context of insurance
123. See generally Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information,
90 Q. J. ECON. 629 (1976).
124. See ABRAHAM, supra note 122, at 11-12. Paraphrasing Guido Calabresi's
famous formulation of the function of accident law, Abraham suggests that insurance
law promotes efficiency whenever it is structured to help reduce the sum of the costs of
insurance and loss prevention. Therefore, counterintuitive though it may seem,
excessive investment in loss prevention sometimes can be inefficient. From an
economic point of view, it is possible to be "too safe." See id.
125. See id.
126. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (1998).
127. See, e.g., JUDGMENTS UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Jolls et al., supra note 126. Jolls and her coauthors
"emphasize that these problems are not ones of insufficient information per se; they are
ones of insufficient ability to process accurately the information one possesses insofar
as that information bears on one's own risks." Id. at 1542. This insight may call into
question the famous aphorism of Louis Brandeis, that "[s]unlight is said to be the best
of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." LOUIS D. BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, Reprints of Economic
Classics, 1914 (1971)). More information may not yield more effective protection.
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purchases, consumers' insurance decisions may be based on distorted
perceptions of risk and alternative framings of premiums and benefits.1
28
For example, consumers will pay more for flight insurance when they
can call to mind vivid images of airplane disasters. 129 Likewise,
consumers will pay more for a policy in which the deductible is added to
the premium and returned (if unused) as a rebate than for an initially less
expensive policy with a conventional deductible. 30 The evidence would
seem to suggest that even if insurance is priced according to objectively
reasonable estimates of risk, the demand for insurance nonetheless may
be skewed by pervasive cognitive distortions. 3' In other words, people
simply may not want to buy the new insurance products Shiller has in
mind, even if in some sense these products would be good for them.
Shiller is well aware of all this. His chapter "The Science of
Psychology Applied to Risk Management" covers a lot of territory in a
few pages: the importance of framing, anchoring, loss aversion, the
tendency to focus on small or unlikely risks and ignore large or likely
ones, commitment, consistency, reciprocity, fairness and naming. 32 The
thrust of his psychology chapter is that people typically underestimate
the risks they face. In particular, people underestimate risks that gather
slowly and therefore lack the visibility of well-publicized disasters.1 33 In
short, many of the psychological phenomena he describes would seem to
undermine the demand for any of his new products such as livelihood or
home equity insurance. Shiller recognizes this too: he notes that
"[p]erhaps the biggest obstacle to effective risk management is
psychological. The public does not see its biggest risks and tends to
focus more often on inconsequential risks that seem to them more
128. See Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance
Decisions, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 224 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
eds., 2000).
129. See id. at 228.
130. See id. at 231-35. This demonstrates another well-documented phenomenon:
loss aversion, or the tendency to place a higher value on a loss than on a gain of the
same magnitude. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
55, 71-72 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004).
131. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 88-89.
132. Shiller's bestseller, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, contains a similar and perhaps
superior discussion of the psychology of risk. See SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE,
supra note 2, at 135-68.
133. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 87-89.
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salient. '1 34  Nonetheless, Shiller remains sanguine that research,
experimentation, advocacy and appropriate framing can promote
effective demand.'35 Given the evidence he cites, his optimism seems to
require additional explanation.
2. Moral Hazard
Index-based settlement realigns the incentives created by traditional
insurance. In a traditional insurance contract, the insured retains some
control over the insurable interest. For example, a farmer who insures
his farm can, in theory, bum down the farm and collect the proceeds on
his property-casualty policy.136  Of course, insurance companies
recognize this problem and have developed devices to combat it,
including deductibles, co-payments, claim verification, and experience
and feature rating. 137  Under index-based settlement with properly
designed and updated indexes, however, the behavior of the insured has
a very attenuated effect on the performance of the index. For example,
in the case of livelihood insurance, an individual insured's decision to
shirk would lower her income, but because she was only a small
participant in the labor market, it would not, by itself, have any effect on
the index of labor market outcomes.'38 Similarly, with home equity
insurance, the insured's decision to stint on maintenance would not, by
itself, depress the index, which is calculated on a broad base such as all
of the homes in a large neighborhood.
39
In this sense, purchasing a livelihood insurance or home equity
insurance policy is analogous, in terms of incentive effects, to buying
shares in a large corporation. Corporations are characterized by the oft-
bemoaned separation of ownership and control: numerous dispersed
shareholders have no effective way to monitor the day-to-day activities
of managers. Even owners of a sizeable number of shares in a large
corporation usually own only a small percentage of the equity. Thus
134. Id. at 269.
135. See id. at 222-27, 269-76.
136. Such an unfortunate eventuality is known in certain circles as a "friction fire"-
so called because the fire is said to result from the friction caused by the insured
rubbing the deed (or mortgage) against the insurance policy.
137. See ABRAHAM, supra note 122, at 2, 72.
138. See id. at 14-15, 61.
139. See SHiLLER, THE NEW FINANcIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 119.
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agency costs, a species of transaction costs, remain an intractable
problem facing corporations. 40 Similarly, owners of livelihood or home
equity insurance policies would have no effective control over the index
on which their policies are settled. Owners of such insurance policies
wishing to affect the index also would face insurmountable transaction
costs.'14
Paradoxically, however, in the insurance context, such transaction
costs would be advantageous because they reduce moral hazard. For
example, consider a homeowner with a home equity insurance policy.
By stinting on maintenance, that homeowner will decrease the value of
her own house but likely will not affect the index. Recognizing this in
advance, the homeowner would have no incentive-at least no incentive
created by the policy itself-to engage in activities adverse to the
insurer's interests. 42 In fact, there would literally be no such activities
that the homeowner could undertake, because the insurance policy only
covers declines in the neighborhood housing index, not declines in the
price of the individual insured's house.
The incentives created by index-settled insurance also may be
illustrated by an analogy to the economic theory of torts. Commentators
have contended that the compensatory function of tort law should follow
the insurance choices individuals would make in actuarially fair
markets. 43 In a sense, such commentators argue, torts should follow
140. See Michael Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICS 386 (1937). Attempts to align the
incentives of owners and managers, for instance by issuing options to senior managers,
largely have been ineffective. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive
Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 76 (2003).
141. For example, in the livelihood insurance context, such costs might involve
finding everyone who started in a given occupation and persuading them to shirk in
their current occupation. In the home equity insurance context, such costs might
involve locating all property owners whose houses make up the index and convincing
them to cease maintenance on their houses, or convincing a large local employer to
leave an area.
142. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 119.
143. See Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency and the Kingdom of
the Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REv. 91 (1993)
(explaining the "insurance theory of compensation," and arguing that the theory has
fundamental normative and practical failings stemming from, among other things,
mistaken assumptions about the utility of wealth in various states of health).
BOOK REVIEW- THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER
insurance. It can be shown that in terms of incentives, index-settled
insurance will follow torts. The goal of the tort system is to get both
parties-injurer and victim-to take the efficient level of care." That
is, if the legal standard of care is set equal to the efficient level of care,'
41
the goal of the tort system is to get both parties to take the standard of
care. 146  A negligence rule accomplishes this by making each party
responsible for 100 percent of the accident costs at the appropriate level
of care. 147 When the injurer takes less than the standard of care, the
injurer is liable for 100 percent of the accident costs. When the injurer
takes the standard of care, the victim becomes liable for 100 percent of
the accident costs. Therefore, once the injurer takes the standard of care,
the victim faces the full costs of precaution and any accident costs, and
will trade those costs off optimally.
48
The incentives of the.insured with index-based settlement may be
analogized to the incentives of the victim under a negligence rule. An
injurer who takes less than the standard of care is liable for all accident
costs. Similarly, assuming settlement of an insurance contract based
entirely on the index, the insurer is liable for any decline in the index.
Note that the victim has effectively no control over the injurer's
investments in care, and the insured has effectively no control over the
144. What it means to take the efficient level of care varies with the context and the
parties. Take the automobile context. For an automobile company, taking the efficient
level of care may mean investing a certain amount in developing safety features. For an
individual driver, taking the efficient level of care may simply entail wearing a seat belt.
For a municipality, taking the efficient level of care may require the posting of signs or
traffic lights at busy intersections.
145. Evidence suggests that the legal standard of care does in fact equal the efficient
level. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 106, at 313.
146. Decision makers can identify the efficient level of care when setting the legal
standard using the famous "Hand Rule" developed by Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The Hand rule states that an
injurer is liable if the burden of adequate precautions (B) is less than the probability of
the harm materializing (P) times the magnitude of the harm if it does materialize (L).
So, the injurer is liable if B < PL. Hand did not specify whether his variables refer to
marginal values or total values. Assuming the former, the "marginal Hand rule" would
state that the injurer is liable if the marginal cost of his or her precaution is less than the
resulting marginal benefit. If an additional dollar of precaution would save more than a
dollar of harm, the injurer is liable. At the standard of care, an additional dollar of
precaution should save exactly one dollar of harm. Id. at 314.
147. Accident costs generally include the costs of precaution and the costs of harm.
148. See COOTER&ULEN, supra note 106, at 310.
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index. 149 Once the injurer takes the standard of care, the victim becomes
liable for all accident costs. Similarly, above the index level the insurer
makes no payout and the insured faces the marginal costs and benefits of
any investment in the insured interest-for example, investments in
effort at work or home maintenance. Therefore, just as a negligence rule
gives victims the proper incentives to invest in precaution, index-based
settlement of insurance contracts creates optimal incentives for
investment.150
Moreover, both labor and housing markets may defy the usual
supply and demand story. In both cases, falling prices may actually
reduce demand because people fear further price declines. For example,
when the "price" of labor, i.e., salaries, go down in a field, the field
becomes less attractive and prices fall further. Similarly, when prices of
houses fall in a neighborhood, demand also falls.'' An important
function of livelihood insurance and home equity insurance would be to
arrest these vicious cycles. Insuring incomes and home values would
increase the demand for jobs and homes, respectively, and thereby
reduce the risk of declining incomes or home values. 52 If this supply-
demand story is true, Shiller's new insurance products can have far-
149. Of course, in certain contexts, victims and insureds may have some effect on
the injurer's precaution or the index level, respectively. For example, ex ante, potential
tort victims can become consumer advocates or can lobby for stricter enforcement of
various laws, such as consumer protection or vehicle and traffic statutes. Ex post, tort
victims can boycott, more or less vocally, the products of tortfeasor corporations.
Similarly, insureds can shirk at work or not invest in home maintenance. However, a
collective action problem is likely to undermine any effort by dispersed groups to
mount a coordinated effort to affect either the level of precaution or the index level. Cf
KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 74-87, 111, 128, 387-89 (Harper Collins College Div. 1986) (noting that
consumers, the most widely dispersed economic interest, remain underrepresented by
lobbyists as compared to more concentrated economic interests).
150. See Robert J. Shiller & Alan N. Weiss, Moral Hazard in Home Equity
Conversion, 28 REAL EST. ECON. 1 (2000) (demonstrating that under home equity
insurance, as well as other forms of home equity conversion, the insured remains the
marginal claimant for returns in excess of the applicable index); see also NALEBUFF &
AYRES, supra note 38, at 56 ("The advantage [of index-based settlement of home
equity insurance contracts] is that it is clean and simple. You have every incentive to
make your home worth as much as possible. If you sell your home for an extra dollar,
you get to keep that dollar.").
151. See NALEBUFF & AYRES, supra note 38, at 55-57.
152. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 118-20 (2000).
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reaching consequences. For example, to the extent that resegregation in
neighborhoods is the result of a decline in expected property values,
home equity insurance can enhance integration.' 3 Thus there could be
an important public goods aspect to home equity insurance, which in
turn might justify some government subsidization of companies, such as
Case Shiller Weiss, Inc., working to create the necessary indexes.
3. Adverse Selection
Index-based settlement of insurance contracts also may help solve
the adverse selection problem, assuming it really is a problem.'14 First
consider a market for livelihood insurance with settlement based on
individual experience rather than an index. Assume there are 1,000
people in occupation A. Half are likely to shirk (the "Shirkers"), and
half are likely to work hard (the "Workers"). Further assume that wages
are responsive to effort, so shirking will result in $100 salary reduction
if the Shirker is caught. Shirkers have a 60 percent chance of a salary
reduction, and Workers have a 20 percent chance of salary reduction.
Therefore, in any year, we expect a wage reductions of $30,000 for
Shirkers (0.6 x 500 x $100) and $10,000 for Workers (0.2 x 500 x
$100), or a total expected salary loss of $40,000 per year. Safejobs
Insurance Co., the only livelihood insurer for occupation A (putting
antitrust concerns to the side for the moment) must charge each
employee in occupation A a $40 premium to cover expected payouts.
If (1) each employee in occupation A knows whether she is a
Shirker or a Worker, (2) Safejobs cannot learn each individual's type
without prohibitive cost, and (3) Workers cannot credibly demonstrate
their type, Safejobs will face an serious asymmetric information
problem.'55 If for regulatory or other reasons, Safejobs can only offer
one livelihood policy, Safejobs will have to charge the "actuarially fair"
153. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1965, 2005-09 (2000).
154. See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter, Siegelman, Adverse Selection].
155. The insurer here is in a position similar to the used car purchaser in George
Akerlof's classic article. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons': Quality,
Uncertainty, and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 489-92 (1970).
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premium of $40.156 A $40 premium will appear expensive to Workers,
who expect to lose $20 in wages, and cheap for Shirkers, who expect to
lose $60 in wages. Workers will not pay $40 to protect themselves
against a $20 expected loss, and therefore will drop out of the insurance
pool. Safejobs will be left charging $40 per person to a pool of Shirkers,
who have an average expected loss of $60, and Safejobs will lose $20
per insured. Thus no "pooling equilibrium" is possible.'57
Alternatively, a "separating equilibrium" may be possible if
regulations permit price discrimination in the livelihood insurance
market. 5 8 If Safejobs can charge a $60 premium for full coverage and a
$20 premium for partial coverage, Shirkers will buy full coverage and
Workers will buy partial coverage because for each individual, the
premium will equal the expected loss. 5 9 That is, offering a menu of
contracts can force insureds to reveal their type, thereby violating
assumptions (2) and (3) in the preceding paragraph. The information-
forcing property of price discrimination by insurers solves to some
degree the asymmetric information problem at the heart of adverse
selection."
Like price discrimination, index-based settlement of insurance
contracts can go a long way toward eliminating the adverse selection
problem; Shiller alludes to this advantage but does not discuss it in
156. If the policy lost money, Safejobs would withdraw it; if it earned profits, a
competitor would enter the market, offer an identical policy for a lower premium and
steal the customers of Safejobs.
157. See Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 123, at 634-37 (1976).
158. Kahan & Kamar write:
[P]rice discrimination occurs when a producer charges a higher price to consumers
with a higher willingness to pay and a lower price to consumer with a lower
willingness to pay. Products do not have to be identical in order for their sale to
consumer at different prices to be discriminatory. What distinguishes price
discrimination from regular price differences between products in competitive
markets is that price discrimination is the sale of products by the same producer at
prices that are in different ratios to the marginal costs of production.
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1215 (2001).
159. Assuming declining marginal utility of wealth, risk averse individuals-that is,
most people-will buy insurance priced at the actuarially fair premium.
160. In practice, regulations often restrict insurance pricing decisions. See generally
Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws:
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CoRNELL L. REv. 1
(1999).
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depth. Under conventional insurance, at a premium of $40, Shirkers
(with an expected loss of $60) will buy the policy and Workers (with an
expected loss of $20) will drop out of the pool. Under index-based
settlement, the actuarially fair premium will remain $40, equal to the
$40,000 expected decline in the income index divided by the 1,000
employees in occupation A.' 6' Shirkers still have an expected loss of
$60, but the expected payout under index-based settlement is $40.
Shirkers no longer have a $20 "arbitrage" profit at the $40 premium, but
at that rate, they still can insure two-thirds of their expected loss.
Assuming Shirkers are risk averse, and assuming no insurer offers a
better policy, insurance at the actuarially fair premium is still a good buy
for them. For Workers, the change from conventional to index-based
settlement would not change incentives. Workers still have an expected
loss of $20, so at a premium of $40, index-settled policies will be too
expensive. Under this scenario, as in conventional insurance, the "bad
risks" stay in the pool and the "good risks" drop out. But the crucial
difference is that the index limits the liability of the insurance company.
Settlement based on the index converts the "bad risks" into neutral risks:
the actuarially fair premium covers the expected insurable loss for even
the worst risks in the pool. Moreover, if the better risks are particularly
risk averse, they may pay the actuarially fair premium even when it
exceeds their expected loss-a kind of reverse adverse selection.1
62
However, though the index may be a powerful tool against adverse
selection at the individual level, insurers still may face macro-level
adverse selection. 63  Although livelihood and home equity insurance
may be able to slow the decline of occupations and neighborhoods, even
insurance cannot-and does not attempt to-thwart change altogether."64
Imagine that a new technology threatens the very existence of an entire
occupational category. For example, a new fabricating technology
161. This assumes, for simplicity, that the presence of insurance does not affect the
probability or distribution of loss. However, as we saw above, insurance for livelihoods
and home values can decrease the probability of the insured event, and thus decrease the
expected decline in the index.
162. See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection, supra note 154; see generally David
Hemenway, Propitious Selection, 105 Q.J. EcON. 1063 (1990).
163. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 124-30.
164. See id. at 135-38.
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begins to eliminate all steelworker jobs. 65 In such a situation, there may
be no "good risks." Over a reasonably short time horizon, the
probability of loss of each insured would approach 100 percent, and the
magnitude of the loss would increase. If the steelworkers union knew of
the impending decline in the industry but the insurer did not-perhaps
an unrealistic assumption given the sophistication of many insurance
companies-the steelworkers union, acting on behalf of members, could
time livelihood insurance purchases to coincide with the decline. This
would exacerbate the downward trend and create a problem of adverse
selection with respect to time.' 66 A similar asymmetric information
problem could distort the market if corporate purchasers, such as real
estate investment trusts or development companies, can purchase home
equity policies (Shiller does not address the point). Such companies
likely would have information superior to the insurer regarding real
estate price trends in an area, 167 and would only purchase policies when
and where they predict imminent price declines. To compensate,
corporate policies might be settled on different, broader indexes than
consumer policies. Similarly, insurers may be able to diversify away
some of this "macro" adverse selection by covering a variety of
uncorrelated sectors.
68
In sum, index-based settlement can help cure adverse selection at
the individual level, but at the macro level, adverse selection may tempt
insurers to exit the very markets where novel risk management products
are needed most.
165. The price of macro securities on the steelworkers' incomes may forecast the
decline, assuming the market is efficient. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER
supra note 5, at 133.
166. See Jack Hirshleifer, War Damages Insurance, 35 REv. ECON. & STAT. 144,
150-51 (1953) (proposing several techniques for resolving the problem of adverse
selection with respect to time, including time-varying insurance premiums and a
mandatory waiting period of six to twelve months between the time insurance is
purchased and the time when it would take effect).
167. See Skogh, supra note 122, at 727 (noting that large corporations often are
larger and more diversified than the insurers to whom they sell risks).
168. For example, diversification of covered sectors has enabled many insurers to
survive numerous asbestos-related lawsuits.
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4. Income-Linked Loans, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
The market for income-linked loans would also have to contend
with the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. 69 Here, as
with the insurance products, the use of an income index to determine
repayments would help solve the problems. First consider the range of
possible repayment scenarios. When a borrower takes out an income-
linked loan, there are eight potential outcomes. 7' The index can go up
or down. If the index goes up, the borrower's income can go up more
than, equal to or less than the index, or the borrower's income can go
down. If the index goes down, the borrower's income can go up, or the
borrower's income can go down less than, equal to or more than the
index. Borrowers with incomes above the index will face a lower
effective interest rate than borrowers with incomes below the index.
Borrowers with incomes at the index will face the target rate.
For example, recall A, our DNA scientist. A takes out a 30-year
income-linked loan requiring her to pay the lender 5 percent of the index
of incomes of DNA scientists for the life of the loan. During the first
year of the loan, the index is at $50,000, and our scientist makes the
average income in the field. She will have to pay interest that year of 5
percent of the index, or $2,500, which equals 5 percent of her income.
Now consider Scientist B. B is also a DNA scientist and takes out a
loan on the same terms as A. Fortunately for B, he is promoted and
makes $75,000 that year. B will also have to pay interest of $2,500, but
for B, this equals an effective annual interest rate of 3.33 percent of
income. A third scientist, C, takes out the same loan as A and B.
Unfortunately, C works at a university facing a budget crunch, and C's
salary during the year falls to $40,000. C also has to pay $2,500 in
interest, but for C, this equals an interest rate of 6.25 percent of income.
Notice how the use of the index addresses the twin concerns of
moral hazard and adverse selection.' 7' The borrower who takes out an
indexed income-linked loan assumes the risk of declining income
169. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 140-48.
170. In the interest of isolating the incentive effects of an index, the following
assumes loan repayments determined entirely by the index. Basing repayment in part
on personal income, as Shiller contemplates, would complicate, but not change, the
basic story. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER supra note 5, at 141.
171. Shiller adumbrates the following points, but does not elaborate on them. See id.
at 140.
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relative to the index. In the example above, each scientist owed the
lender $2,500 regardless of what happened to that scientist's income.
No individual would be able to affect the performance of properly
defined indexes, 72 and therefore taking out an income-linked loan
would not create an incentive to work less hard. On the contrary, as
demonstrated by the lower effective interest rate paid by B, an income-
linked loan could encourage people to work even harder.
73
As in the insurance market context, adverse selection here is closely
related to moral hazard. We should not expect those who suspect their
incomes will fall below the index to take out income-linked loans.
74
Recall C from the example above. The index puts a floor on the amount
of interest, in dollar terms, the borrower owes under an indexed income-
linked loan. Therefore, at the individual level, only average or better
than average credit risks should be attracted to income-linked loans.
However, at the macro-level, lenders do retain the risk that an income
index, i.e., an entire occupational category, will decline faster than
expected. Lenders can diversify such risks away by lending to
borrowers in a broad range of occupations. Alternatively, if macro
markets for occupational incomes exist, lenders could, in theory, hedge
their index risk in the macro markets.
In addition, there may be cognitive obstacles to the practicability of
income-linked loans. Debtors may overestimate their ability to earn
income in the future. This could have the same effect as adverse
selection-a higher proportion of bad credit risks in the pool-without
172. Conceivably, it is possible that in a small enough field, the members could get
together-for example through a union meeting or at a conference-and agree to stop
working, thereby depressing the value of the index and reducing their loan obligations.
This is also a potential problem with home equity insurance; there the institution for
collusion might be a homeowners association or a town legislature. However, such an
eventuality is unlikely for a number of reasons. First, even in the smallest fields, the
collective action problem and the related hurdle of obtaining credible commitments
from colleagues likely would undermine such a scheme. Second, it is unlikely that
people would sabotage all of their income to save on loan repayments or to collect
livelihood insurance proceeds. Third, indexes probably could be designed to
compensate for such strategic behavior by, for example, tying repayment terms in small
fields to an index broader than the field itself. Fourth, such a stratagem could be
defined in the loan agreement or the livelihood insurance policy as an event of default
giving remedies to the lender or the insurance company.
173. Once again, this assumes wages are responsive to effort.
174. See SHILLER, THE NEW FiNANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 141-44.
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debtors affirmatively selecting against lenders. 17 Note that with loans,
the index might not counter this "residual" adverse selection as
effectively as in the insurance context. 176 With loans, the borrower has
the money until default; with insurance, the insurer has the money until
the loss occurs. The lender has to get its money back whereas the
insurer has to pay its money out, and, as they say, "possession is nine-
tenths of the law." Also, borrowers would have to learn how income-
linked loans work, how to compare the terms of various loans, and how
such loans could be advantageous. Debtor education can play a crucial
role in reducing financial hardship, as is evident from the inclusion of
debtor education provisions in bankruptcy reform bills passed in 2001
by both houses of Congress.1
77
D. Indexes and Law
Though Shiller does not address the idea at any length, indexes can
have a profound effect on various legal doctrines. In this section, I use
examples from the law of nuisance, contracts and takings to demonstrate
the potential of indexes to enhance fairness and efficiency. The
examples are intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive; indexes
have the potential to improve the operation of a variety of doctrines
beyond those discussed here.
175. The three major consumer credit rating agencies-Equifax, Experian and
TransUnion-may be able to contain this problem by revising their rating systems.
176. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 141-44.
177. Both the House and the Senate passed bankruptcy reform bills in 2001. Both
bills contemplated mandatory postpetition financial management courses for every
individual debtor in the United States who commences a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13
bankruptcy case. Under the proposed legislation, failure to complete the course could
result in a denial of discharge. See The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, §§ 105 & 106, 107th Cong. (2001); The Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, §§ 105 & 106, 107th Cong. (2001); see also Susan Block-
Lieb et al. Lessons from the Trenches: Debtor Education in Theory and Practice, 7
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 503, 507-10 (2002) (discussing the rationale for post-
filing debtor education, and describing a pilot project to provide a voluntary financial
management course to 1200 individual debtors in the Eastern District of New York,
sponsored by the Coalition for Consumer Bankruptcy Debtor Education).
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1. Public Nuisance
One of the major obstacles that impedes bargaining between a
polluter and nearby property owners is the collective action problem.
17
Theory predicts that the cost of organizing and coordinating town
residents is prohibitively high, and therefore residents will not present a
unified front across the bargaining table from the polluter.1 79 Residents
are relegated to the courts, where the usual remedy for nuisance is a
damages award rather than an injunction. 180 Shiller's home equity
insurance plan also can help solve the collective action problem.
Imagine a pristine town. American Insurance Group, or AIG, opens a
branch in the town and sells a home equity insurance policy to each of
the town's 90 households when the average home value according to the
index is $100,000. Then American Electric Power, or AEP, moves in
and opens a smoke-belching factory. Within a few months, the index
has fallen to $60,000. AIG owes each household $40,000, a $3.6
million loss that AIG will not suffer gladly. AIG pays the losses, and
any nuisance claims of the town residents are automatically assigned to
AIG through a process known as subrogation.' 8' Thus instead of 90
178. See, e.g., generally Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1969).
179. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities
and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004); see also
Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 871 (stating that the amelioration of a public problem like air
pollution "is likely to require massive public expenditure and to demand more than any
local community can accomplish and to depend on regional and interstate controls").
180. See, e.g., Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 875 (awarding an injunction to residents near
a polluting factory with the option in the factory owner to pay damages and have the
injunction vacated). Damages are the usual remedy because in high transaction cost
settings-such as most public nuisance situations-injunctive relief is predicted to
cause holdout and collective action problems, and thereby thwart the efficient allocation
of resources. By contrast, damages remedies effectively give the polluter a call option:
the polluter can purchase the right to pollute if the value of polluting exceeds the price
of the call.
181. See 4 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 17.11[3][a]
(3d ed. 1999) ("Subrogation is an assignment by operation of law. When one party's
claim is fully subrogated to another party, the subrogor relinquishes all interest in the
subrogated claim. By operation of law, the subrogee becomes the real party in
interest."). Subrogation most commonly occurs "in an action by an insurance company
seeking reimbursement for its payment to the insured .... Id. "An insurer which has
paid the full loss suffered by the insured is subrogated to the insured's entire claim and
becomes the sole real party in interest." Id. See also United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
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disparate and uncoordinated nuisance plaintiffs, there is now one.
Further, that nuisance plaintiff is a large, wealthy corporation that has
the same interest as the townspeople: to stop the pollution. The
collective action problem is solved, and town residents get a check from
the insurance company-the equivalent of what they would get from a
nuisance suit, but without the legal hassles. In the process, the insurer
may even get a reputational boost for opposing large corporate interests
on the side of individuals. In effect, the index operates here like a clause
in a conventional insurance contract excluding reductions in value
caused by insufficient maintenance, and restricting coverage to value-
reducing acts that are not the fault of the owner.
2. Contracts
Shiller's indexes also can help resolve the so-called "paradox of
compensation" that affects many areas of private law.1 2 This may be
illustrated with examples from contracts and takings. 183 In contracts, the
promisor must invest in performance. The promisor has optimal
incentives to invest in performance when she fully internalizes the
promisee's loss from breach. At the same time, the promisee must rely
on the contract. The promisee internalizes the costs of performance
when he receives no compensation for breach. Since compensation paid
by the promisor for breach must equal compensation received by the
promisee, contract law would seem incapable of providing efficient
incentives. However, contract law has evolved at least two doctrines to
resolve the paradox: expectation damages and liquidated damages.8 4
With expectation damages, promisees are only compensated for
foreseeable reliance; excessive reliance remains uninsured. 85  With
liquidated damages, the contract stipulates an amount to be paid in case
Co., 338 U.S. 366, 380-81 (1949) ("If the subrogee has paid an entire loss suffered by
the insured, it is the only real party in interest and must sue in its own name.").
182. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 106, at 246-48.
183. See id. at 246.
184. See generally MARIiN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE
LAW OF CONTRACT. 142, 173 (2d. ed. Foundation Press 1993).
185. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 ENG. REP. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854). The
foreseeability rule of Hadley is embodied in Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 351(1) (1979); see generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REv. 563 (1992).
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of breach; the promisor is only liable for the liquidated damages, while
the promisee is liable for his actual damages.'86 Therefore, both
expectation damages and liquidated damages are said to be invariant
with respect to reliance: under both, damages are based on some
measure external to the promisee's reliance.
18 7
Shiller's indexes could be used in conjunction with these devices to
create efficient incentives for performance. In calculating expectation
damages, courts can look to the index to determine what reliance is
"foreseeable" in a particular context. For example, imagine A is a
builder who contracts with B to build a store by the first of January.
Suppose A fails to complete the store by the first of January as
promised, and B has to rent temporary space elsewhere. The court may
consider it foreseeable that if A failed to finish on time, B would have to
rent alternative space; the court might award damages based on the
additional rent. But what's stopping B from renting luxury space and
thereby increasing his damages? An index of rental prices for retail
space in the area could be a useful reference for the court in determining
whether B's actual rent equals the foreseeable rent. Alternatively, the
contract between A and B could have specified liquidated damages in
terms of the index. For example, the contract could have stipulated that
for each day the store remained uncompleted past the first of January, A
would have to pay B liquidated damages of, say, 3 percent of the index
of monthly retail rental prices.
Similarly, indexes can enhance the precision of the common law
duty to mitigate damages for breach of contract."' The usual remedy for
breach of contract is expectation damages. The goal of expectation
damages is to give the non-breaching party the benefit of her bargain,
that is, to put her in the financial position she would have been in had
the contract been performed according to its terms (as construed by the
court). 89 However, the non-breaching party has a competing duty to
mitigate her damages. The non-breaching party cannot recover damages
for losses that, with reasonable effort, she could have avoided once she
186. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the
Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554 (1977).
187. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of
Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 15 (1985).
188. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 184, at 147.
189. See id. at 142.
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became aware of the breach.' 90 In effect, the plaintiff's damages are
offset by the value of any mitigating contract.' 9'
By analogy, for the insurance products proposed by Shiller, the
index operates like a mitigation requirement, reducing or eliminating
altogether the proceeds the insured would collect if the policy were
settled based on individual experience. 92  In the example above,
imagine that A fails to complete the project by the first of January, and
the court decides to award damages based on B's additional rent. B
rents luxury space for $5,000 per month, but the index of retail real
estate rental prices is at $3,500 per month. This suggests that with
reasonable effort, B could have rented sufficient space for $3,500 per
month. B's damages will be restricted to the index amount, and the
excess $1,500 per month in rent will remain "uninsured."
3. Takings
Takings also demonstrate the paradox of compensation. If the
government compensates property owners for all takings-more
precisely, if government actions that arguably are regulations are instead
characterized as compensable takings-owners have an incentive to
make excessive improvements. In effect, owners will be reimbursed for
any expenditures, a kind of moral hazard. On the other hand, if
government pays no compensation for takings, the government has an
incentive to overregulate private property. 93 In the takings setting, the
190. See id. at 147 ("In effect, the injured party is under a legal obligation to take (or
else be presumed to have taken) reasonable steps to avoid waste and minimize the cost
of breach."); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a
General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 967 (1983) ("The duty
to mitigate is a universally accepted principle of contract law requiring that each party
exert reasonable efforts to minimize losses whenever intervening events impede
contractual objectives.").
191. Similar "offset" principles operate in the field of tort law. For example, the
related doctrines of contributory negligence, comparative negligence and assumption of
risk all reflect the idea that even if the defendant's actions have caused harm to the
plaintiff, the defendant need not compensate the plaintiff to the extent that the plaintiffs
own actions were a contributing cause of her injury. See COMMERCIAL DAMAGES A
GUIDE TO REMEDIES IN BuSINESS LITIGATION § 4.02 (Charles L. Knapp ed. 2004).
192. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 269-72.
193. But see Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 375-76 (2000) (arguing,
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paradox of compensation is resolved when the government buys an
option from the property owner. The government can trigger a taking at
any time within the option period, and "just compensation" will be the
price specified in the option contract. The property owner bears the loss
of any improvements in excess of the option price. 94
An index of real estate prices can create incentives similar to an
option. Suppose courts adopted a rule whereby just compensation
would be determined by reference to an index of real estate prices in an
area. Assuming the index was properly constructed, no individual
property owner would be able to affect the value of the index, and so the
property owner would have no incentive toward excessive
improvements in anticipation of a taking.
A related point is that index-settlement of home equity insurance
could mitigate the unfairness of "derivative takings." A derivative
taking is present whenever a physical or regulatory taking diminishes the
value of surrounding property.1 95  Owners of taken property are
compensated for the taking while owners of surrounding properties are
not compensated for the reduction in property values caused by the
taking. 196  The decrease in surrounding property values, while not
compensated by the government, nonetheless would depress the index of
real estate prices. The decline in the index would trigger payouts to
surrounding property owners under home equity policies. In effect,
home equity insurance settled on an index would enable the government
to externalize on insurance companies the costs of derivative takings.
197
contrary to the conventional wisdom, that "[i]nterest group theory suggests that without
a compensation requirement government will under-take, not over-take, and that
compensation forces government decisionmakers to internalize less of the social costs
of taking, not more").
194. See Cooter, supra note 187, at 22.
195. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L.
REV. 277, 280-81 (2001).
[D]erivative takings are a hybrid of their more familiar close cousins [physical
and regulatory takings]. They resemble regulatory takings in that they reduce the
value of property without physically appropriating it. Yet, they are distinct from
regulatory takings in that they may arise as the result of a physical taking. And,
unlike its cousins, the derivative taking never appears alone; it must always be
preceded by a physical or regulatory taking.
196. See id. at 280.
197. Efficiency requires the government to internalize all the costs of takings. Id.
Thus while home equity insurance could mitigate the inequity of derivative takings, it
would offer less of a corrective to the inefficiency of derivative takings.
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As in the nuisance context, an insurer probably is better equipped than a
group of dispersed property owners to oppose an inefficient taking."
However, a cautionary note is in order. At least two factors suggest
that calculating just compensation by reference to an index of real estate
prices might lead to systematic undercompensation of victims of takings
(or derivative takings).' 9 First, an index of fair market values likely
would not capture idiosyncratic private valuations or the subjective
value property owners derive from living in a close-knit community."0
The second is loss aversion, or the tendency of people to be hurt more
by losses than helped by gains of the same magnitude. 20 ' The subjective
value of homes to their owners may be higher than the fair market value
of their homes as measured by the index.0 2 On the other hand, index-
based compensation may be an improvement over the present system.
198. On a related note, William Fischel has analogized zoning to insurance, arguing
that zoning is the "insurance mechanism" by which property holders protect the value
of their homes. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE
POLICIES 9-11 (2001). However, zoning can only provide limited "insurance
coverage." For example, if the Federal Government decided to construct an Interstate
through a neighborhood, a local zoning board could not do very much to overturn the
decision. By contrast, index-settled home equity insurance would, in theory,
compensate owners whose property values are decreased by proximity to the Interstate.
Thus, as compared to zoning, index-settled home equity insurance may offer more
comprehensive insurance against derivative takings.
199. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 179.
200. See id.
201. See ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 5 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds.,
2004) ("[W]e suffer more.., when we fall from a better to a worse situation, than we
ever when we rise from a worse to a better." (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF
MORAL SENTIMENTS 311 (Bell 1892) (1759)).
202. See William A. Fischel, The Offer/Ask Disparity and Just Compensation for
Takings: A Constitutional Choice Perspective, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 187, 193
(1995) (observing that the writers and raitifiers of state constitutions were aware, as
property owners themselves, that paying market value for property taken by eminent
domain would undercompensate owners). Nonetheless, lawmakers restricted
compensation for takings to market value because paying above-market compensation
would require forgoing certain public works, and increasing taxes to pay the asking
price might itself entail a taking.
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E. Implementing the Ideas
Shiller, in NFO, claims to approach risk management from behind a
Rawlsian "veil of ignorance. 20 3 That is, NFO sets out to address the
question: if people did not know their "class position or social status,"
their "fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities," their
"intelligence," or their "strength," what risk management system would
they choose? 204 Shiller's answer consists in a dramatic expansion of the
risk management products available for private purchase. However,
given human decision-making errors confirmed in scores of
experiments, and accepting that the risks identified by Shiller are serious
and real, I think merely expanding the array of offerings may not go far
enough. From behind the veil of ignorance, people might in fact
welcome certain inroads on freedom of choice.
An emerging strain of scholarship offers a means of reconciling
intervention in individual choices with a concern for autonomy. The
idea, known variously as "asymmetric paternalism" or "libertarian
paternalism," suggests that planners (government or private) can
increase social welfare by setting default rules that create benefits for
those who make errors but impose little or no harm on those who are
fully rational.2 °5 For example, in retirement savings, the current default
rule is that workers contribute nothing to their 401(k) plans unless they
affirmatively elect to participate. If the default rule is changed so that
workers are assumed to contribute unless they affirmatively choose not
to, contributions increase dramatically.206 Such a plan creates benefits
for those who fail to save while imposing minimal costs on those who
allocate earnings to current consumption.20 7
203. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 17.
204. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (rev. ed. 2000).
205. See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics
and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism, " 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211, 1212 (2003);
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron,
70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1159, 1162 (2003).
206. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 205, at 1159-60.
207. See Camerer et al., supra note 205, at 1227-28 (discussing the perception
among policy makers that people are not saving enough for retirement and noting that
participation in retirement savings plans is significantly higher when the default option
is automatic enrollment).
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Asymmetric or libertarian paternalism can help put Shiller's private
sector ideas into practice.2 °8 For instance, the default could be set to
require employees to "purchase" a certain amount of livelihood
insurance,2°9 and to allocate any income contributed to 401(k) plans to a
diversified portfolio of macro securities. Similarly, banks can require
mortgagors to take out home equity insurance, just as they currently
require certain mortgagors to take out private mortgage insurance.210
And the default personal loan can be linked to income. In each case,
individuals could choose to opt out. Planners can change the likelihood
of opt out by altering the associated cost; requiring a little more
paperwork likely would yield a lot less opt out. The
asymmetric/libertarian paternalist approach to the new financial order
has the following advantage: consumers who do not understand the
products but would benefit from them will, while consumers who do
understand the products but choose not to purchase them incur only the
minimal costs of opting out.
211
III. PUBLIC SECTOR IDEAS
This section describes and critiques Shiller's public sector ideas. I
first describe and critique Shiller's domestic policy proposals-his
proposals for reform of the tax, social security and money systems. I
then describe and critique his foreign policy proposal. Overall, Shiller's
private sector ideas seem better-developed and more practicable than his
public sector ideas. While the private sector ideas have to contend with
208. This assumes, of course, that Shiller intends his ideas to be put into practice.
However, it is also possible to understand NFO not as a blueprint for change, but as a
work of theory concerned with pointing policy makers in the right direction rather than
implementation. I think the better reading is that NFO evinces a serious commitment to
practical change; as such, the book demands and deserves an assessment of its real-
world practicability.
209. The premiums might be paid by the employer, but in effect taken out of the
employee's salary, much as the employer share of Social Security contributions is paid
today. See Edward J. McCaffrey, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861,
1874-84 (1994), reprinted in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 401-05 (Cass R.
Sunstein, 3d ed. 2003).
210. See NALEBUFF & AYRES, supra note 38, at 54-56 (explaining why banks will
require some borrowers to take out private mortgage insurance and describing the risks
of the housing market).
211. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 139-42.
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market forces-and seem to do so in novel and often ingenious ways-
the public sector ideas have to deal with complicated political variables
that can scuttle even the best economic policies. A discussion of politics
and institutions seems like a necessary supplement to Shiller's public
sector proposals, but NFO omits any such discussion.
A. Inequality Insurance and the Tax Code
What Shiller calls "inequality insurance" is in fact a proposal to
overhaul the tax system to lock in a legislated level of income
inequality.2 2  Under the current U.S. tax system, Congress sets the
marginal tax rates and tax brackets.1 3 Congress delegates to the
Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service the authority to
administer and enforce the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.2'4
Shiller proposes that instead of legislating marginal tax rates and tax
brackets, Congress could legislate the total amount of taxes raised and a
target level of after-tax income inequality.215
To explain inequality insurance, Shiller first illustrates his concept
of inequality by describing (verbally) a Lorenz curve (so named after its
developer, Max 0. Lorenz).1 6 The Lorenz curve is a graph that shows
the percentage of national income received by percentage of households.
The percentage of households is plotted on the horizontal axis and the
percentage of income is plotted on the vertical axis. Thus, the Lorenz
curve demonstrates graphically a statement such as "the bottom 50
212. See id. at 149 ("The idea for inequality insurance presented here is that
government should set by legislation the level of income inequality.., and create a tax
system that prevents inequality from getting worse.").
213. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2003) (listing tax brackets and marginal tax rates).
214. See DAVID M. HUDSON & STEVEN A. LIND, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 29
(7th ed. West 1998) ("The Treasury Department is the executive agency which has the
authority and responsibility to administer and enforce the provisions of the [Internal
Revenue] Code, and it is generally the Internal Revenue Service [the I.R.S.] within the
Treasury Department which deals with the income tax."); see also Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2003).
215. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 149-50 (explaining
how the inequality insurance payments would be calculated, distinguishing the system
of taxing according to a rate schedule from a system that would define a total dollar
amount to be raised).
216. The inclusion of some graphs in NFO may have clarified an often technical
discussion.
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percent of households receive 20 percent of national income. '2 7 In a
perfectly equal society, 10 percent of households would have 10 percent
of income, 50 percent of households would have 50 percent of income,
and so on. Such a state of affairs would be depicted as a straight Lorenz
"curve" with a slope of one: at every point along the curve, the
percentage of households would equal the percentage of national income
received by that percentage of households. This straight line is aptly
called the "line of perfect equality. 2 18 Any inequality would cause the
Lorenz curve to sag below the line of perfect equality. The greater the
"sag," the more inequality. This sag is measured by the Gini coefficient
(so named after its developer, the Italian statistician Corrado Gini),
which is the ratio of the area between the line of perfect equality and the
Lorenz curve to the entire area (the triangle) under the line of perfect
equality.
219
Under a system of inequality insurance, Congress would legislate a
target Lorenz curve, from which a target Gini coefficient could be
derived.220 Congress would delegate to the Treasury Department, the
duty to calculate the tax liability of each household so that the actual
after-tax Lorenz curve matched the legislated target.22'
The process used by the IRS annually to recalculate the tax liability
of each household might be envisioned as "a gigantic spreadsheet with
millions of rows., 222 Column A would list the pre-tax income of every
household in the country, sorted from lowest at the top to highest at the
217. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 150.
218. See, e.g., SCIENCEDAILY, Lorenz Curve, at
http://www.sciencedaily.com/encyclopedia/Lorenzcurve (last visited Dec. 11, 2003)
(quoting WIKIPEDIA THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, Lorenz Curve, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenz_curve (last visited Mar. 10, 2004) (describing the
Lorenz curve)).
219. In other words, if the area between the line of perfect equality and Lorenz curve
is A, and the area underneath the Lorenz curve is B, the Gini coefficient is A/(A+B).
This is often expressed as a percentage. See SCIENCEDAILY, Gini Coefficient, at
http://www.sciencedaily.com/encyclopedia/Ginicoefficient (last visited Dec. 11, 2003)
(quoting WIKIPEDIA THE FREE ENYCLOPEDIA, Gini Coefficient, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ginicoefficient (last visited Mar. 10, 2004)).
220. Note that while the target Gini coefficient would measure total inequality, the
target Lorenz curve would define both total inequality and the specific distribution of
income.
221. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 150.
222. See id. at 151.
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bottom. The sum of these incomes would be the national income. Total
taxes would be subtracted from total national income to yield after-tax
national income. Column B would allocate this after-tax national
income according to a formula: each household would receive an
amount equal to the total after-tax national income multiplied by the
difference between its percentile on the target Lorenz curve and the
percentile on the target Lorenz curve of the preceding household in
Column A.223 Column C would show each household's total tax liability,
equal to Column A minus Column B. Column C would constitute that
year's tax schedule, and would replace the marginal tax rates and tax
brackets currently found in Section One of the Internal Revenue Code.224
The process would be repeated annually.
225
Shiller also contemplates variations on the basic idea. A plan of
inequality insurance could take account of government transfers and
other taxes, as well as demographic changes and medical expenses.226
To effect its equitable goals, the animating legislation could permit the
distribution of income to become more equal.227 Similarly, to counter
any disincentive effects of high effective marginal tax rates, an upper
limit can be imposed on such rates.22' Finally, to prevent the timing of
income from having a distortionary impact on lifetime taxes and saving,
inequality insurance could take the form of a tax on consumption as
opposed to income.229
223. For illustration, consider the unrealistic situation in which gross national
income is $10,000,000, and Congress decides to take a quarter in taxes, so after tax
national income is $7,500,000. Household X is in the 48th percentile of income, and
the preceding household (in Column A of the hypothetical spreadsheet) is in the 47th
percentile. Household X would have after tax income of 1% of $7,500,000, or $75,000.
224. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2003).
225. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 151.
226. See id. at 153.
227. See id. at 153-54 (explaining how Congress could "legislate that the income
distribution is allowed to become more equal ... in accordance with basic standards of
fairness and incentives").
228. See id. at 153, 160-62.
229. See id. at 154; see also JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A
CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 172 (2d ed. MIT Press
2000) ("The key distinction between an income tax and a consumption tax is that
income taxes have a negative impact on the incentive to save, whereas consumption
taxes do not.").
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Shiller stresses that his idea of inequality insurance is based in
"concepts of human psychology rather than in pure economic or political
theory."23 He predicts that calling the proposal "insurance" rather than
a "tax" should make it more palatable to more people. 23'
B. Intergenerational Social Security
The proportion of retirees to non-retired workers is poised to
increase dramatically in the coming decades, threatening the viability of
social security systems worldwide.232 Numerous factors are contributing
to the "old age crisis." The "baby boom" of the late 1940s, the
introduction of the birth control pill in the 1960s (which lowered birth
rates), increasing life expectancies, and the structure and capitalization
of social security systems.213  The "pay-as-you-go" social security
system used by the United States and many other countries is not
sustainable at current contribution and benefits rates.3 Various reform
proposals have attempted to circumvent the politically unpalatable
230. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 155.
231. See id. at 155-56.
232. See id. at 165 ("Either the relatively small number of the younger people who
are still of working age will take on a large burden of caring for these elderly, or many
of these elderly will be facing a miserable existence.").
233. World Bank, Averting the Old Age Crisis (Oxford Univ. Press) (1994) (noting
that in 1990, there were five hundred million people in the world over the age of sixty
and by 2030 there will be 1.4 billion).
234. Under the U.S. "pay-as-you-go" system, employees pay (or "contribute") a
social security tax of 6.2 percent of income up to $84,900 (in 2002), and employers pay
a social security tax of 6.2 percent of the income of each of their employees up to the
same maximum. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 166-67.
Retiree benefits are calculated according to a formula whose only inputs include age at
retirement and average indexed monthly earnings. Benefits are indexed to the
Consumer Price Index, so inflation does not erode the real buying power of benefits. In
any year, the contributions collected are paid directly as benefits to current retirees.
Contribution and benefits formulas are designed so that contributions roughly equal
benefits. The Social Security Trust Fund has been set up to compensate for any
discrepancy between contributions and benefits. However, the Trust Fund does not
contain assets sufficient to fund all Social Security liabilities. See id.; see also
SYLVESTER J. SCHIEBER & JOHN B. SHOVEN, THE REAL DEAL: THE HISTORY AND
FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 388. (Yale Univ. Press 1999). ("Even with the optimistic
projections of [the 1983 Social Security Amendments], the reformed system would run
large deficits, beginning with the second decade of the twenty-first century.").
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options of cutting benefits or increasing contributions (i.e., raising
taxes).2 35  The most prominent reform proposals would allow (or
require) workers to invest all or part of their contributions in individual
accounts which the account holder could invest in stocks, bonds, or
other instruments. 36 Shiller derides individual account proposals as
fiscally irresponsible,237  and instead proposes what he calls
"intergenerational social security."
He observes that the family has been the traditional institution for
sharing risks among generations, permitting flexibility in response to
changing income needs.238 However, relying exclusively on the family
for intergenerational risk sharing provides only limited risk spreading,
and introduces the risk of family instability.23 9 Intergenerational social
security would preserve the flexibility of the family and spread
intergenerational income risk to all of society.
Whereas the current system transfers all of the income risk of
retirees to workers and their dependents,4 ° intergenerational social
security would allocate available labor income among workers and
retirees according to a more equitable standard.24' Under one simplified
scheme, each working person would "contribute" to social security a
percentage of her annual income (after other taxes) equal to the
percentage of current retirees in the population.242 Currently, about 11
235. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 168.
236. See, e.g., Peter Ferrara, Editorial, Let the Campaign Begin, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1,
2003, at A14 (discussing a personal account proposal and arguing that personal
accounts could achieve permanent solvency for Social Security).
237. See SHILER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 173 ("Those who
advocate these individual accounts appear to have drawn the wrong lessons from
modem finance.").
238. See id. at 170-72.
239. See id.
240. Thus social security, as presently constituted, would appear to be plagued by a
moral hazard problem. Recognizing this, the designers of the current system have built
in certain devices for mitigating moral hazard. For example, social security benefits are
offset in many instances by income from other sources. Such offsets may be viewed as
analogues to the deductibles and co-insurance schemes used by private insurance
companies to combat moral hazard. See ABRAHAM, supra note 122, at 2 ("A deductible
provision specifies a sum to be deducted from the amount an insurer would otherwise
be obligated to pay the insured; a coinsurance provision specifies the percentage of a
loss an insurer must pay the insured.").
241. See SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE, supra note 2, at 170.
242. See id. at 169.
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percent of the United States population is retired, so under this system,
each worker would pay a social security tax of 11 percent of income.243
Retirees would receive a benefit proportional to their average indexed
earnings during their working years.2 4
C. Revamping Tax and Social Security?
Shiller proposes major overhauls of two of the largest institutions in
the United States and other countries-tax and social security-yet does
not accompany his proposals with any theory of legislation. 45 Can his
proposals pass muster under any plausible understanding of the political
process?
In an influential book, Farber and Frickey concluded that "[o]ur
best picture of the political process.., is a mixed model in which
constituent interest, special interest groups, and ideology all help to
determine legislative conduct., 246 In a trenchant study of tax legislation
in the 1980s, David Shaviro added a fourth category, closely related to
constituent interest and ideology: legislator self-interest. 247  Shaviro
concluded that legislation provides a language by which legislators
communicate symbolically with members of the general public, and
offers a means of increasing their personal prestige.248  Legislation
therefore promotes reelection; any real-world effects are incidental to
legislators' self-interest.
249
243. See id.
244. For example, imagine (unrealistically) that 2004 social security contributions
totaled $10,000,000 and that the averaged indexed monthly earnings of X, a retiree,
constituted 0.01% of the total average indexed monthly earnings of all current retirees.
X would receive social security benefits for 2004 of $1,000.
245. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 4 (commenting that
"[a] major role of advocacy must fall to our governmental leaders" but making no
recommendations of specific steps those leaders should take).
246. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP A. FRICKY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 33 (1991).
247. See David Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1,
1-11 (1990). For a thorough and entertaining account of the passage of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, see JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI
GULCH (1987).
248. See Shaviro, supra note 247, at 8.
249. See id. at 8-10.
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Constituent interest in Shiller's tax and social security plans would
depend, of course, on the preferences of the constituency as understood
by legislators. This tautology does not help us determine the two plans'
likelihood of political success. In any case, Kenneth Arrow famously
proved that in general, individual preferences cannot reliably be
combined into a coherent societal preference.2 50 The "public interest" is
not "out there" to be discovered, though legislation still can claim to
represent the public interest when certain standards of fairness and
stability are met.2
The interest group theory argues against the likelihood of passage
of Shiller's ideas. The brunt of the inequality insurance burden threatens
to fall on those with relatively more political clout-those with more to
lose, in money terms, and hence more willing to spend on organizing to
oppose the legislation.252 Intergenerational social security would shift a
portion of the income risk to retirees, whereas under the current system
retirees face no income risk (though they do face systemic risk-the
chance that the system will become insolvent).253  Retirees have an
organized interest group--the AARP-whereas the broad and diffuse
group of non-retired workers has no such group. Moreover, currently
non-retired workers ultimately will retire; even in the presence of
"hyperbolic discounting, ' 254 workers may be disinclined to support a
program that helps them today but will hurt them tomorrow. Therefore,
one can expect coordinated opposition to intergenerational social
security.
250. See KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 17-19 (Yale
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1963).
251. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 246, at 58-59.
252. See id. at 19-20 ("The activities of organized interests build into the American
political system a minoritarian counterweight to some of its more majoritarian
tendencies," and "the minorities thus benefited ... are disproportionally but not
uniformly affluent ones.") (citing K. SCHLOZMAN AND J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED
INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986)).
253. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 167.
254. Hyperbolic discounting refers to the tendency to discount the future at an
unreasonably high rate. Under hyperbolic discounting, even a substantial sum to be
received a few years from now is essentially worthless today. See George Loewenstein
& Richard Thaler, Intertemporal Choice, in THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 92-106 (Richard Thaler ed., Princeton Univ. Press
1992).
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As for ideology, it may be assumed that quite a few members of
Congress are concerned with inequality, and would in theory like to do
something to limit wealth disparities. Similarly, it is safe to assume that
no member of Congress would like to see Social Security go bankrupt.
However, these ideological concerns may be trumped by the factor
255identified by Shaviro: legislator self-interest. Would any self-
interested politician purposefully alienate better-off voters or the
growing ranks of retirees? Probably not, despite ideological
predilections.
In sum, the political process often can obstruct even the best
economic ideas. 56 For Shiller's tax and social security proposals,
politics may prove an insurmountable hurdle, especially when the
substantial costs of switching to new systems are considered.
Incremental improvements may prove a more practicable means to
similar ends. For example, use of the earned income tax credit can be
expanded to reduce inequality. Similarly, individual accounts with a
default allocation to a portfolio of macro securities (with a right to opt
out of the allocation) may offer a way for the ideas in NFO to
supplement, rather than supplant, social security reform proposals that
already have some political traction.
Cognitive theory suggests another criticism of Shiller's tax and
social security ideas.257 Shiller takes for granted that Congress would be
able to legislate a "target" level of inequality. Similarly, Shiller assumes
that Congress could legislate a sliding scale whereby social security
contributions change with the percentage of retirees in the population.
However, the target rate and the annual percentage likely would become
salient in the public imagination, just as the top marginal income tax rate
255. See SHAVIRO, supra note 247, at 9 ("[S]ucceeding legislatively is a means of
exercising and demonstrating one's power. It is inherently gratifying (as when an
emperor enjoys seeing statues of himself), and it increases one's prestige and status in
political circles. Thus, without regard to its actual effects, legislation can promote self-
interested goals apart from reelection.").
256. See Jack Hirshleifer & J. W. Milliman, Urban Water Supply: A Second Look,
57 AMER. ECON. REv. 169, 178 (1967) ("The agenda for economists, at this point,
should place a lower priority upon the further refinement of advice for those efficient
and selfless administrators who may exist in never-never land. Rather, it should focus
on devising institutions whereby fallible and imperfect administrators may be forced to
learn from error.").
257. See McCaffery, supra note 209, at 408.
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is particularly prominent under the current revenue code.258 The rate and
the percentage might become proxies for the underlying ideas, thereby
obscuring the merits of the plans and diverting attention from the issues
of equality and shared risk. In addition, even if it were possible,
"locking in" the current level of inequality-or any level of inequality-
might be inconsistent with the notion of social mobility fundamental to
our political culture.
Under both proposals, substantial opposition could develop if rates
became too high. This could happen if inequality worsens or if many
people retire.2 59 For the tax plan, Shiller notes that marginal rates might
be capped. 260 But capping rates would undermine the very redistributive
purpose of the plan. For social security, high contribution rates could
engender resentment against retirees. Moreover, the tax burden imposed
by both plans would be cumulative. While retirees and the least well-off
taxpayers could benefit, others could wind up paying a majority of their
incomes in tax, at marginal rates well above the "Maginot Line" thought
to exist at a rate of 40 percent.26' Finally, the proposal aims to effectuate
Shiller's concept of vertical equity-how the tax burden should be
distributed among people of different levels of wealth-but does not
address horizontal equity, or whether there may be justifiable grounds
for assigning different tax liabilities to people of equal wealth.262 In a
258. See id. ("[Tlhe nominal income tax rate structure set out in Section 1 of the
Internal Revenue Code and well publicized in the financial and general press, especially
when Congress changes it, is particularly prominent. More specifically, the single
highest rate bracket is socially prominent, whereas each person's individual highest
bracket is individually prominent.").
259. Under Shiller's inequality insurance plan, relative wealth will remain the same
only within the jurisdiction of the tax. However, relative standing between the
inequality insurance jurisdiction and other tax jurisdictions could change. See ROBERT
FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HuMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS
34-38 (Oxford Univ. Press 1985) (discussing the importance of relative standing in
subjective perceptions of wealth).
260. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 161 ("People may
react with anger and a sense of injustice if forced to give most of the income they earn
above a certain level to the government.").
261. See McCaffrey, supra note 209, at 416. This may engender more "tax
planning," off-shore incorporation and similar efforts to circumvent the reach of the
IRS.
262. See SLEMROD & BAKUA, supra note 229, at 51-84 (describing vertical and
horizontal equity). In any case, determining the relative fairness of different tax
systems is infamously difficult. Id. at 53.
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similar vein, the proposal would effect a redistribution of wealth among
taxpayers, but not among taxpayers and those who do not earn enough to
pay income tax. Therefore, the least well-off in society-those who do
not pay taxes-would not benefit directly from the proposal.
D. New Units of Measurement and Electronic Money
"Money illusion"-the tendency to think of value in nominal terms
rather than in terms of real purchasing power-has a long tradition in
economics. Irving Fisher dedicated an entire book to it in 1928,263 and
in 1965, Don Patinkin argued that an individual can be said to be
suffering from money illusion if his demand for commodities depends
on anything other than relative prices and real wealth.264 Edlar Shafir
and colleagues have argued that "money illusion is a widespread
phenomenon in the United States today. 2
65
Shiller partakes of this tradition, and stresses that inflation can
cause dislocating redistributions of wealth.266 For example, inflation can
shrink the real value of dollar-denominated debt, thereby hurting
creditors such as holders of government bonds.267 To mitigate money
illusion, Shiller proposes the introduction of indexed units of account, or
as he denominates them, "baskets. 268 One indexed unit of account or
"basket" would purchase a market basket of consumer goods and
263. See Eldar Shafir et al., Money Illusion, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS 484 (Colin F. Camerer et al., eds., Princeton Univ. Press 2004) (speaking
generally about IRVING FISHER, THE MONEY ILLUSION (1928)).
264. See id. (paraphrasing DON PATINKIN, MONEY, INTEREST, AND PRICES 22 (2d ed.
1965)).
265. See id. at 483 (noting that "money illusion could manifest itself in a reluctance
to sell a house or shares of stock at a nominal loss, or a reluctance to accept nominal
wage cuts"). Shiller is sensitive to the potential negative psychological effect of
nominal wage cuts, even when reduced wages would retain their purchasing power. See
SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 217-20.
266. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 202-03.
267. Inflation therefore contributes to the superior historical long-term performance
of stocks over bonds. See JEREMY SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN: THE DEFINITIVE
GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MARKET RETURNS AND LONG-TERM INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 33
(3d ed. 2002).
268. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 206.
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services. 269  That is, regardless of the price of the market basket in
dollars, one basket (the unit of account) would always be equal in value
to the market basket; put yet another way, the purchasing power of the
basket would remain constant.270 The baskets could be implemented in
conjunction with an expanded electronic payment system so that the
ultimate means of payment-dollars, euros, gold or anything else-
would be of little concern to individuals.27'
Like the GRIDs, the creation of baskets would involve both
governments and the private sector. First, governments would have to
create the legal framework. This would involve defining the baskets,
affirming their status as legal tender, enforcing contracts based on
baskets, and specifying the conversion ratio between baskets and the
country's currency. 72 Second, the government would have to produce
indexes reflecting changes in the price of the market basket of goods and
services. In the United States, the Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, already performs a very similar function in producing
the CPI. 273  On the private side, Shiller suggests that firms also can
compile and analyze statistical data, both to compete with the
government-produced indexes and to serve as a check on the
government's credibility. 274  Private companies also can create and
refine electronic payment systems for use with baskets.275
269. The United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, uses a
similar "market basket" concept in calculating the Consumer Price Index. The
Consumer Price Index measures the average change over time in the prices paid by
urban consumers for a market basket of consumer goods and services. See
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpifaq.htm#Question-l (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
270. As for real world precedents, Shiller tells the story of the Chilean unidad de
fomento ("UF" or unit of development), the world's first indexed unit of account. See
SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 204-18. Chileans use the UF
for real estate sales and rentals, payments of mortgages, taxes, child support and
alimony. However, wages and goods prices are still denominated in pesos. Id. at 205.
Five other Latin American countries also have established indexed units of account. Id.
at 211.
271. See id. at 205.
272. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 212 (describing the
"easy" steps governments can take to alleviate the effect of inflation on individuals).
273. See http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
274. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 214-16 (cautioning
that a substantial percentage of people in both developed and developing countries
distrust the reliability of inflation indexes produced by the govemment).
275. See id. at 216.
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Shiller concludes by suggesting the creation of a variety of indexed
units of account for use in the payment of wages.276 For example, an
indexed unit of account called the "common hour" could be created to
reflect the average wage rate for employees in a specific area and
industry.277 A variation on this theme is the "professional hour,"
reflecting the average wages of a designated group of professionals.278
As an alternative to common hours or professional hours, units may be
based on indexes of labor productivity or GDP. 279  Finally, "senior
baskets" could be created to reflect the market value of a basket of
goods regularly consumed by the elderly. 280
A fair and administratively efficient deployment of baskets would
seem to require their uniform adoption. Consider wages and taxes under
the current tax regime. If wages are indexed but taxes are not, nominal
wage gains will push taxpayers into steeper brackets, or higher along
within their current top bracket, so that their real tax burden increases.2,
This failure to index, characteristic of the current income tax system, is
known as "bracket creep," and offers the legislature a conveniently
insidious method of raising taxes.282 If taxes are indexed but wages are
not, nominal increases in tax brackets will cause fixed salaries (between
raises) to slide into lower brackets, or backwards in their current top
bracket-taxpayers' real tax burden and Treasury receipts both would
decrease. Of course, if both wages and taxes are indexed, both will keep
pace with inflation and the real tax burden will equal the legislated one;
this would force legislators to "internalize" the political costs and
benefits of any changes in the bracket and rate structures. In short, a
piecemeal rollout of "baskets" could have unintended distributional
consequences. Or under a more callous view, those consequences may
be intended and exploited by policy makers.
276. See id. at 217-18.
277. See id. at 217.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 217-18.
280. See id. at 217.
281. See McCaffrey, supra note 209, at 412; see also SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL
ORDER, supra note 5, at 210 (alluding to this phenomenon in the context of indexed
government debt, but not addressing the problem of indexing wages without at the same
time indexing taxes).
282. See McCaffrey, supra note 209, at 413.
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As the tax example illustrates, indexed units of account have a
potentially powerful application in statutory drafting.2 3 Statutory fines
and penalties, licensing fees, and various legislated rates all can be
drafted in terms of indexed units of account rather than in absolute
dollars. This could obviate the requirement of legislatures periodically
to revisit statutes, and thus could serve as a self-correcting
counterweight to the problem of statutory obsolescence.2
Finally, it should be noted that various methods already exist to
hedge inflation risk, some of which Shiller mentions.28 5 In 1997, the
U.S. Treasury Department introduced Treasury Inflation Protected
Securities, or TIPS.286 These are U.S. government bonds in which the
principal is adjusted (upward but not downward) for inflation.287
Corporations have also issued inflation-linked debt.288 In addition,
parties can swap inflation risk in over-the-counter markets, and, as of
recently, buy or sell exchange-traded futures contracts based on the U.S.
Consumer Price Index.289 However, as Shiller observes in discussing the
benefits of macro securities over perpetual futures, existing methods of
hedging inflation, such as the foregoing, may not be accessible to most
283. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 208 (offering an
anecdote involving an outdated statutory fine).
284. See generally GuIDo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982) (describing and addressing the problem of statutory obsolescence).
285. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 237-39 (describing
the futures markets as a method to hedge inflation risk).
286. Seeid. at210.
287. Earlier this year, The Wall Street Journal reported:
The amount of TIPS outstanding grew to $176 billion last year from $121 billion in
2000, according to the Bond Market Association trade group. On Monday, the bond-
market trade group sent a letter to Treasury encouraging the government to expand
TIPS sales to include a 20-year bond. Most TIPS currently have maturities of 10
years or fewer.
Aaron Lucchetti, Inflation Rears Its Head... If Only on New Bond Issues, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 28, 2004, at Cl.
288. See id. (reporting that Fannie Mae sold inflation-linked bonds in 1997, and
noting that "investors expect to see more corporate inflation-linked deals in the coming
months").
289. See Press Release, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Chicago Mercantile
Exchange Sets Feb. 8 Launch For CPI Futures (Jan. 15, 2004) (announcing the launch
of CPI futures, and noting that "[t]hese new contracts will be the first product CME has
listed on a major economic indicator"), available at http://www.cme.com/abt/news/03-
14CPILaunch6042.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2004).
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people.2 90 Baskets effectuate the same goals without the daunting
complexity of bonds, swaps and futures.
E. International Agreements for Risk Control and Foreign Aid
No individual or group can make credible, long-term commitments
on behalf of a whole society. As a result, robust international risk
sharing requires action by governments on behalf of their citizens. In
the new financial order, government would enter "international
agreements for risk control" resembling the swaps familiar to financial
markets.29' An "international agency" (Shiller does not specify which)
would match countries or blocks of countries 292; ideally, the counterparties
would be unequal in terms of level of development and geography.293
Contract design would proceed in three phases. First, the parties would
specify expected growth rates for GDP. 94 Second, the parties would
specify a schedule of annual payments whereby the country whose
growth rate relative to expectations is higher makes payments to the
country whose growth rate relative to expectations is lower. Third, the
parties would assign weights to the parties to the contract based on the
relative magnitudes of the parties' risks, their relative per capita GDP,
and their relative populations.295
As an alternative to the swap structure, the international agreements
could be structured as a pair of contracts, one between each side and the
international agency that helps arrange the deal. Shiller notes that such a
structure may be more politically palatable.2 96  Alternatively, the
international agreements may be framed as parallel or "back-to-back"
loan agreements. Under such a structure, obligations under the loans
290. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 126 (noting that
certain derivatives exceed the understanding of the average investor).
291. A swap is the exchange of one income stream for another. See RICHARD A.
BREALEY & STUART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 642-43 (4th ed.
1991).
292. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 175.
293. See id. at 184-85 ("Risk sharing is generally more potent among dissimilar
parties than among similar parties.").
294. See id. at 178.
295. See id. at 177.
296. See id. at 175.
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would appear as simple debts, and therefore would be more
comprehensible and more likely to be honored.297
Besides explicitly transferring wealth, such international
agreements could have a positive ex ante economic value: contracts
could improve welfare and enhance risk taking by entrepreneurs in the
2981iparty countries. Such international agreements, Shiller concludes,
would be vastly superior to the self-interested, informal, and non-
contractual foreign aid arrangements in place today.299
Like contracts between private parties, Shiller's international
agreements for risk control are subject to default. But unlike contracts
between private parties, there is no authority with power adequate to
enforce the international agreements-no court, as it were, backed by
the power of the state.3°° Shiller does not identify the agency he
envisions for administration and enforcement; the United Nations comes
to mind, but its resources are patently unequal to the task of enforcing
long-term, high value agreements.30 Recognizing the near impossibility
297. See id. at 179.
298. For example, Shiller and a colleague designed a hypothetical 10-year contract
with India on one side and a group of more developed nations on the other. They found
that the ex ante economic value of the contract for India would be over 10 percent of a
year's GDP in India. That is, the mere existence of the contract-before any
payments-would increase India's expected economic welfare by 10 percent. See id. at
180. For the United States, one of nine more developed countries on the other side of
the hypothetical contract, participating in the contract yielded an ex ante economic
value of 0.2 percent of a year's GDP. Id. at 181.
299. See id. at 182-83.
300. In a classic article, Calabresi and Melamed suggested that the state's monopoly
on the legitimate use of force stands behind various legal arrangements. Calabresi and
Melamed wrote:
When a loss is left where it falls in an auto accident, it is not because God so ordained
it. Rather it is because the state has granted the injurer an entitlement to be free of
liability and will intervene to prevent the victim's friends, if they are stronger, from
taking compensation from the injurer. The loss is shifted in other cases because the
state has granted an entitlement to compensation and will intervene to prevent the
stronger injurer from rebuffing the victim's requests for compensation.... In any
given dispute... the state must decide not only which side wins but also the kind of
protection to grant.
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1091-92 (1972).
301. See, e.g., Alix M. Freedman & Bill Spindle, Rescue Mission: Now at the Top of
the UN. 's Agenda: How to Save Itself, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2003, at Al ("The U.N.
has been through ups and downs in its 58-year history but rarely has it been so hobbled
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of ensuring enforcement through any means short of war, countries will
find it difficult to make credible commitments to make future payments,
and without credible commitments, there can be no contracts.30 2 Shiller
suggests that risk sharing can be most effective among countries
separated by geography and economic conditions.3 3 However, it is
precisely these differently situated countries that are most likely to have
varying contractual cultures-varying degrees of familiarity with
obligations, differing norms regarding default and its consequences.
Thus the best opportunities for risk sharing are most susceptible to the
risk of default.
Even assuming enforcement is possible, a significant political
problem remains. Shiller addresses the concern that poor nations may
default on their obligations, even if circumstances improve in those poor
nations, by citing evidence that India repaid its debts to certain of the
former Soviet republics after the fall of the Soviet Union.304 However,
Shiller misses a potentially much bigger problem-the likelihood of
international pressure on rich nations not to demand payment under the
agreements from poor nations if circumstances in the poor nations
improve. Even if payment is forthcoming, Shiller does not address the
"infrastructure" problem: how, especially in less developed nations, is
the money paid under international agreements supposed to get from the
government coffers to the people? Particularly in countries with fewer
economic and political freedoms, one can easily imagine corrupt
government officials fudging GDP numbers then pocketing the
payments.
Even if the agreements did work as expected, still they would have
to confront a moral hazard problem. If people in a country know that
any drop in national income beyond expectations is "fully insured," they
will have less of an incentive to work hard to increase national income.
As for adverse selection, basing settlement on changes in GDP relative
in its ability to promote peace, speak with a unified voice and even provide
humanitarian assistance."); Steve Stecklow, At the Table: Before Iraq War, U.N., US.
Hatched Plan to Feed Nation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2003, at Al (describing the
"complexity of the U.N.'s role in a world that now contains a single superpower-and a
newly restive one").
302. See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000).
303. See SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER, supra note 5, at 184-85.
304. See id. at 180.
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to expectations, rather than on absolute changes in GDP, should in
theory mitigate the problem. However, the story may be different in
practice. Politicians seeking reelection would like to tell their
constituents that circumstances are improving. It would be difficult for a
politician to pose as an optimist and at the same advocate a national
insurance policy. Similarly, assuming, as seems plausible, that
improving economic conditions are accompanied by pervasive
overoptimism, it would be difficult to sell voters an agreement whereby
a large part of their gains are taxed away with no immediate local
benefits. In short, the countries most likely to want to enter international
agreements are those that think they need to-those with private
information suggesting worse times are ahead. Adverse selection
remains.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, I understand NFO as a work in progress-as an
invitation into a provocative discourse on the potential of financial ideas
to improve peoples' lives, but by no means the last word on the subject.
And I think Shiller would agree; he notes that "[t]o make the ideas for
risk management work, we need more than has already been
outlined., 305 One leaves NFO with a powerful sense of the ability of
financial ideas to inform democratic ideals. Shiller is to be commended
for framing the discourse on the direction of finance in terms ofjustice.
305. To facilitate the process of research and advocacy, Shiller has set up a website
at http://newfinancialorder.com/ containing links to many of the articles cited in the
book.
